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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes impor-
tant decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The purpose
of the Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases that significantly
affected earlier interpretations of North Dakota Law, and other potential
cases of interest. As a special project, the Associate Editors wrote the
Review for North Dakota Law Review.
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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CIVIL PROCEDURE- JUSTICIABILITY - STANDING
TRIPLE QUEST V. CLEVELAND GEAR Co.
In August 1997, Triple Quest, a North Dakota corporation, sued Cleve-
land Gear Company, an Ohio corporation, in Cass County seeking damages
for defective gearboxes.I Cleveland Gear's answer asserted defenses
pursuant to the contract between the parties, which included a clause that
stipulated any claims between the parties would be decided under Ohio law
and venued in Cuyahoga County, Ohio.2 In May 1999, Cleveland Gear
moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that the contract clause
stipulated all claims would be governed by Ohio law and that Triple
Quest's damages should be limited to the amount it paid Cleveland Gear.
3
The trial court denied Cleveland Gear's request to limit damages, but it
found Ohio law governed the dispute.
4
In May 2000, Ralph Thomas, a creditor of Triple Quest, purchased all
of Triple Quest's assets at a sheriff's sale and assigned his interest to Fun
Flight, LLC.5 Cleveland Gear moved for the action to be dismissed without
prejudice so that the parties could "venue this matter in [Cuyahoga] County,
Ohio."6 Fun Flight countered by arguing the forum selection clause was not
exclusive and that Cleveland Gear had waived its right to rely on the clause
by litigating in North Dakota for three years. 7 The trial court dismissed the
action without prejudice, finding "the proper venue for this case and the
jurisdiction for it [was] in the state of Ohio" and that Cleveland Gear had
not waived its right to enforce the forum selection clause. 8 The court did
not comment on Fun Flight's motion to substitute parties and amend the
caption of the case. 9 Fun Flight appealed. 10
Generally, a trial court's dismissal of an action without prejudice is not
appealable because either side may commence another action if the order
"neither 'determines the action' nor 'prevents a judgment from which an
appeal might be taken."" 1 However, courts have found that a dismissal of
1. Triple Quest v. Cleveland Gear Co., 2001 ND 101, 2,627 N.W.2d 379, 380.
2. Id. 3.
3. Id.
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an action to enforce a forum selection clause, which results in the action
being litigated in another jurisdiction, is an appealable order.12
For an order enforcing a forum selection clause to be appealable, it
must be considered "collaterally final."13 To find an order collaterally final
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, "the order must conclusively determine the dis-
puted question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final
judgment."14 The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the trial court's
ruling was collaterally final because it permanently terminated the action in
North Dakota and because it would have been res judicata to bring the same
action in Ohio.15 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the
trial court's order to be appealable.' 6
Cleveland Gear argued that Fun Flight did not have standing to pursue
the appeal.' 7 The law states a party is entitled to have a court decide the
merits of its case only after demonstrating it has standing to litigate the
issues before the court.18 North Dakota case law has stated that a contrac-
tual assignment of rights may confer standing to appeal.19 The North
Dakota Supreme Court found that not allowing Fun Flight to pursue an
appeal would be wholly inconsistent with Rule 25(c) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure. 20
12. Id. (1 8, 627 N.W.2d at 381-82. The reason for this exception is because a dismissal
without prejudice has the practical effect of terminating the litigation in one of the parties chosen
forums. Id. at 382.
13. Id. 99.
14. Id. (quoting Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F.2d 273, 278
(9th Cir. 1984)).
15. Id. 91 10.
16. Id. J 11.
17. Id. 9 12.
18. Id. 91 13.
19. Id.




( 1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court may order sub-
stitution of the proper parties. The motion for substitution may be made by any party
or by the successors or representatives of the deceased party and, together with the
notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon per-
sons not parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons, and
may be served in any judicial district. Unless the motion for substitution is made not
later than ninety days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a state-
ment of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of one or more of the
defendants in an action in which the right sought to be enforced survives only to the
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Fun Flight argued that the trial court erred in finding the forum selec-
tion clause dictated that Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.21
When construing a written instrument the primary objective is to ascertain
the intent of the parties and give effect to it.22 A contract is considered
ambiguous if its language could have two or more conflicting but reasona-
ble interpretations. 23 In this case, the contact read, "Buyer and Seller con-
sent to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Ohio and to the venue in
Cuyahoga County." 24 The Ohio Court of Appeals has construed this
language to mean the parties have waived their right to object to personal
jurisdiction in the designated area rather than waiving their right to bring an
action in places other than the designated area. 25 Based on this, the North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that the forum selection clause was
ambiguous as to whether it made Ohio the exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes between the parties.26
The last issue the court decided was whether Cleveland Gear waived its
right to raise a forum selection clause defense.27 Waiver is a voluntary
relinquishment of a known right.28 Cleveland Gear pleaded the forum
selection clause defense in its answer and referred to it in the motion for
summary judgment. 29 Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's
summary judgment ruling because a genuine issue of material fact existed
surviving plaintiffs or only against the surviving defendants, the action does not abate.
The death shall be suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of
or against the surviving parties.
(3) After a verdict is rendered or an order for judgment is made in any action, such
action shall not abate by the death of any party, but the case shall proceed thereafter in
the same manner as in cases where the cause of action survives by law, and
substitution of parties shall be allowed as in other cases.
(c) Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued
by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to
whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the
original party. Service of the motion shall be made as provided in subdivision (a) of
this rule.
N.D. R. Civ. P. 25.
21. Triple Quest v. Cleveland Gear Co., 2001 ND 101, [ 17, 627 N.W.2d 379, 383-84.
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as to whether Cleveland Gear waived its right to rely on the forum selection
clause. 30
CIVIL PROCEDURE-MISJOINDER OF PARTIES
PRAUS V. MACK
Christian Praus was killed while working on a construction project.31
The main contractor of the project was James Cape and Sons (Cape), and
Praus was employed by an electrical subcontractor (Edling).32 Keith Brown
Trucking (Brown) had the subcontract to haul the wet cement, and it
subcontracted with another independent contractor, Brian Mack (Mack), to
do the work.33 Praus was killed when Mack's truck backed over him.34
Praus' widow, Carolina, brought a wrongful death action against Cape,
Brown, and Mack in March 1996.35 The complaint alleged that Mack's
negligence was the direct cause of Praus's death and that Brown and Cape
were responsible because of their failure to evaluate and monitor the con-
struction site.36 Brown cross-claimed against Mack under their contractual
indemnity agreement. 37 Cape also cross-claimed against Brown and filed a
third-party complaint against Edling for indemnity. 38
In December 1997, Brown successfully moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that it was not responsible for the negligence of Mack, its
independent contractor. 39 The trial court noted that the dismissal was based
on the lack of evidence to show that Brown had any control over Mack at
the time of the accident, and Brown was awarded attorney fees.40 The court
also noted that Cape might have been entitled to summary judgment for the
same reasons.41
Cape then moved for summary judgment in April 1998.42 Praus had
engaged different counsel at this point, and Praus argued that Cape was
required to maintain control over the project under federal law because the
30. Id. at 386.
31. Praus v. Mack, 2001 ND 80, 9 2-3, 626 N.W.2d 239, 243.
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project was a federal highway project.43 Praus also submitted evidence that
Cape had exercised control over the method and manner of work on the
project, so the summary judgment motion was denied.4 Praus and Brown
then settled, and Praus' claim against Brown was dismissed with
prejudice. 45
In March 1999, the parties appeared for a settlement conference to
discuss the subject of joint liability between Brown, Cape, and Edling under
federal law.46 In May of that year, the court ruled that state law was not
preempted by federal law and that several liability would apply.4 7
Praus moved to sever Cape's indemnity claims against Edling and
Brown, but the trial court refused.48 At trial the jury found that Praus,
Mack, and Cape all proximately caused Praus' death and assigned the
following percentages of fault: Praus-60%, Cape-25%, Mack-15%. 49 The
jury determined that Edling was also at fault, but that it's actions or
omissions were not the proximate cause of Praus' death.50 Brown was not
found to have any fault.51
Because Praus was found to be 60% at fault, the trial court dismissed
the action and did not rule on the indemnity issues under the various con-
tracts. 52 It then denied Praus' motion for a new trial on the severance issue;
this appeal followed.53
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that broad judicial discretion is
granted in consolidation issues.54 Joinder of claims is liberally provided for
by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. 55 Rule 42(b) provides for
the severance of trials and was intended to further the convenience of the
parties, avoid prejudice and delay, and serve the ends of justice, and it
should only be used when a separation of trials would achieve these pur-
poses.56 Courts employ a balancing test, weighing the risks of prejudice
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. 9 11.
46. Id. 9 12, 626 N.W.2d at 245.
47. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1996)).
48. Id. 1 5, 626 N.W.2d at 243. The negligence actions formed the basis of this dispute, and
the contract claim by Cape against Brown, as well as Brown's cross-claim against Mack, were
severed in early 1999. Id. 11, 626 N.W.2d at 244-45.
49. Id. 5, 626 N.W.2d at 243.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. 14, 626 N.W.2d at 245.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. 9 16.
56. Id. 9 16-17, 626 N.W.2d at 245-46; N.D. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
[VOL. 78:579
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and possible confusion against the possibility of inconsistent verdicts from
the same operative facts, and consider judicial economy to determine
whether joinder is proper.57
Praus contended that she was prejudiced by the trial court's consolida-
tion of the claims because the ruling on several, as opposed to joint, liability
essentially precluded the possibility of indemnification claims between the
defendants. 58 The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the trial court's rul-
ing. 59 The court noted that the trial court was not required to rule on issues
of indemnity until considerations of fault had been determined by the jury. 60
Praus also alleged that Brown's participation in the trial was prejudicial
because the claims against Brown had been dismissed by summary judg-
ment prior to the trial. 61 The court noted that the summary judgment issued
to Brown was a non-certified interlocutory order, and therefore, was subject
to revision at any time under North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure
54(b).62 Because Cape's substantially similar summary judgment motion
was denied, Brown had legitimate concerns regarding the validity of the
summary judgment motion and could have been found liable for negligence
at the jury trial.63
Finally, Praus argued that she was prejudiced by facing the additional
counsel provided by Brown and Edling.64 Justice Kapsner's opinion noted
that facing multiple counsel was not per se prejudicial, and all of the claims
arose out of the same incident. 65 Therefore, there was no abuse of discre-
tion in combining the negligence and indemnity claims because Praus failed
to show that she was unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of the claims.66
Praus also alleged that granting additional peremptory challenges to the
defendants was erroneous. 67 The court noted that North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure 47(b) allows four peremptory challenges per side when a
57. Praus v. Mack, 2001 ND 80, 9 17, 626 N.W.2d 239, 246 (citing Malcolm v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1993)).
58. Id. 919.
59. Id. ( 20, 626 N.W.2d at 247. The subcontracts in question contained provisions to in-
demnify Cape for failure to comply with applicable laws, rules, regulations, and OSHA conditions
relating to the machinery and materials used in the project. Id. 91 21-22. The subcontract be-
tween Cape and Edling also contained a provision requiring indemnification of Cape for any act or
omission of Edling or its agents. Id. 22.
60. Id. -123.





66. Id. 91 26,
67. Id. 127.
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nine-person jury is being empanelled. 68 However, the court noted that
when the parties on one side have "essentially adverse or antagonistic inter-
ests," additional challenges can be granted.69 In this case, the granting of
the additional challenges was not made in error because the defendants'
interests were adverse and antagonistic to each other.70
Next, Praus argued that the trial court erred by refusing to allow her
experts to testify whether the defendants violated federal and state safety
regulations. 7' The trial court allowed the experts to testify as to industry
customs and practices, but not about whether these regulations were vio-
lated by the defendants, because it determined that such testimony would
have been prejudicial to Cape and Mack.72 Under North Dakota law, the
violation of OSHA regulations constitutes evidence of negligence, not
negligence per se, and the trial court stated that the jury could have errone-
ously considered the violation to be negligence per se.73 The supreme court
noted that whether the conduct of the parties constituted a violation of state
or federal regulations was a decision to be made by the jury, and therefore,
it found no error in the trial court's ruling on this issue.74
Praus then argued that the jury instructions given constituted reversible
error.75 Initially, Praus argued that the failure to include an instruction con-
cerning the customs and practices of the industry was in error.76 The court
likened an instruction on custom and usage to an instruction on the sudden
emergency doctrine, and it noted that the refusal to give an instruction on
either was not reversible error if the instructions adequately informed the
jury of the law. 77 Second, Praus contended that the failure of the court to
instruct the jury on the federal requirements regarding accident prevention
and notification of unsafe conditions was erroneous. 78 This contention was
also refuted because the jury instructions given were adequate and the par-
ties had been given the opportunity to argue the theory to the jury. 79
Finally, Praus alleged that the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the
68. Id. 28, 626 N.W.2d at 249.
69. Id.
70. Id. 30-31.
71. Id. 9[9[ 32-33.
72. Id. ( 33, 35, 626 N.W.2d at 249, 250.
73. Id. 35, 626 N.W.2d at 250.
74. Id. 36, 626 N.W.2d at 250-51.
75. Id. 9 37, 626 N.W.2d at 251.
76. Id. [ 39.
77. Id. 19 40-42, 626 N.W.2d at 251-52.
78. Id. 9 43, 626 N.W.2d at 252.
79. Id. 9[l 44-46.
[VOL. 78:579
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jury regarding the liability of a corporation for the actions of its agents. 80
The court noted that the instructions were adequate because the trial court
did instruct the jury as to the liability of third parties for actions of persons
under their control and management. 81
Lastly, Praus argued that the verdict was tainted and a new trial was
warranted because two of the jurors viewed the accident scene without
authorization. 82 The record showed that a separate hearing was held to
determine the extent of the jurors' viewing of the scene. 83 The unautho-
rized inspection of an accident scene by a juror may be grounds for a new
trial "if there is a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic material [provided
by the juror's investigation] could have affected the verdict." 84 Five factors
are used to determine if juror misconduct has occurred. 85 These factors are:
(1) whether the accident scene was related to the essential issue in the case;
(2) whether the juror's statements regarding the accident scene rendered
him equivalent to a defense witness in the jury room; (3) whether a previous
motion for the jurors to view the scene had been denied; (4) whether the
unauthorized viewing was a casual observance or an intentional investi-
gation; and (5) the point in the time of the trial when the jury misconduct
occurred and when it was discovered.86 In this case, the court noted that the
accident took place at a busy intersection in the city, that the viewings were
essentially casual and not intentional investigations, and that the separate
hearing on the issue was adequate. 87
Justice Neumann concurred in the result, but he agreed with the dissent
that Brown and Edling should not have participated in the trial.8 8 Addi-
tionally, Justice Neumann stated that the additional peremptory challenges
given were excessive.89 However, he viewed the errors to be harmless, and
stated that, in his opinion, Praus received a fair trial despite the unequal
allocation of peremptory challenges.90
80. Id. 9147.
81. Id. 48-49, 626 N.W.2d at 252-53.
82. Id. 51, 626 N.W.2d at 253.
83. Id. J 52-53.
84. Id. 54, 626 N.W.2d at 254.
85. Id. 55.
86. Id.
87. Id. TT 56-57, 626 N.W.2d at 254-55. In a footnote, the court mentioned that the proper
course of conduct when juror misconduct has been discovered is to notify the court and to make
sure private questioning among the jurors is stopped "in order to reduce the possibility of juror
taint from extrajudicial pressures." Id. 91 57 n.2, 626 N.W.2d at 255.
88. Id. (1 61 (Neumann, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id. TT 63-66, 626 N.W.2d at 255-56.
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In her dissent, Justice Maring found prejudicial error in Brown's
participation in the trial.9' Justice Maring noted that when the trial court
dismissed the summary judgment against Brown, it concluded as a matter
of law that Brown had no allocation of fault in the accident. 92 The indemni-
fication clause in the contract between Cape and Brown did not require
indemnification for Cape's negligence, but only for Brown's failure to
comply with applicable regulations. 93 Therefore, Cape did not have a right
of indemnity against Brown under the contract because Brown had no
fault. 94 Justice Maring determined the two parties did not have adverse
interests, and therefore, granting additional peremptory challenges to
Brown was prejudicial. 95 She used the same rationale with regard to the
inclusion of Edling, and the peremptory challenges it was granted, because
under the North Dakota's workers' compensation laws, Edling, as an
employer, was immune from suit by its employees and could not be sued by
a third-party tortfeasor. 96 Justice Maring considered that the erroneous
grant of additional peremptory challenges occurred because of the errone-
ous refusal to sever the claims.97 She noted that, in the end, the defendants
were given eleven challenges while Praus only received six, which allowed
the defendants "almost a two-to-one advantage in the selection of the
jury." 98 In Justice Maring's opinion, this discrepancy caused a prejudice to
Praus' right to a fair trial and warranted reversal of the trial court's
decision.99
CIVIL PROCEDURE-STATE AND FEDERAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS
STATE EX REL. OLSON V. HARRISON
In State ex rel. Olson v. Harrison,l00 the defendants' 01 appealed a
district court order that granted summary judgment to the State of North
91. Id. 77, 626 N.W.2d at 258 (Maring, J., dissenting).
92. Id. 9f 73, 626 N.W.2d at 257.
93. Id.
94. Id. 9175.
95. Id. 91 77, 626 N.W.2d at 258.
96. Id. 91 78-83, 626 N.W.2d at 258-59.
97. Id. 1 92, 626 N.W.2d at 260.
98. Id. ' 90.
99. Id. 9 94, 626 N.W.2d at 262.
100. 2001 ND 99, 627 N.W.2d 153.
101. The defendants included Milwaukee Insurance Company (hereinafter Milwaukee),
Roxanne Harrison, Florine Harrison (parent of Madeline Harrison), Thomas Rutten (a claims
adjuster), and Heinrich & Company. Harrison, T 5, 627 N.W.2d at 154.
[VOL. 78:579
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Dakota.102 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court
order. 103
In 1999, Tracey Makes Good (TG) was driving an automobile on the
Spirit Lake Reservation when she collided with a vehicle driven by Rox-
anne Harrison.104 The collision resulted in the deaths of two individuals
and injuries to others. 105 The Makes Good car was insured by Milwaukee
Insurance Company (Milwaukee) and had a policy limit of $50,000.106 The
Harrison vehicle was not insured.107
Milwaukee negotiated a settlement 08 between the parties and filed a
petition for approval of the settlement of claims in the Spirit Lake Tribal
Court.109 The petition named the North Dakota Department of Human Ser-
vices (Department) as a defendant, and a notice of the hearing on the peti-
tion was sent to the Department."10 The Department did not respond, and
after the hearing, the tribal court approved. the settlement.IlI The tribal
court found that both the Department and Benson County Social Services
were not entitled to any portion of the settlement." 2 The State sued the
defendants alleging that it had paid for medical services received by Rox-
anne and Madeline Harrison, that the Harrisons had assigned any claims
they had against liable third parties to the State, that the State had not been
properly served in the tribal court proceeding, and that the Harrisons and
Milwaukee were liable for conversion of money owed to the State."13
The district court, in granting the State's motion for summary judg-
ment, concluded the tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and
that proper service was not made on the State." 4 On appeal, Milwaukee
claimed the district court erred in determining that the tribal court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction.' '5 Milwaukee claimed that the tribal
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. 9 2. The vehicle driven by Tracey Makes Good was owned by Amaris Makes Good,




108. Id. Thomas E. Rutten, Howard Nelson, and Heinrich & Company negotiated a
settlement on behalf of Milwaukee. Id.
109. Id. 9 3.
110. Id. Carol K. Olson was executive director of the department. Id.
111. Id. 4.
112. Id.
113. Id. 9 5,627 N.W.2d at 154-55.
114. Id. ( 6, 627 N.W.2d at 155. The summary judgment ordered payment from the
defendants to the State. Id.
115. Id.
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court's order should have been recognized as a matter of comity and that
the district court failed in not granting Milwaukee's motion for summary
judgment based on the failure of the State to exhaust all its available
remedies in tribal court. 116
The North Dakota Supreme Court first examined whether the Spirit
Lake Tribal Court had subject matter jurisdiction and whether proper
service had been made.1 7 It stated Article I Section 9 of the North Dakota
Constitution authorized the legislature to direct the manner, the courts, and
the cases that may be brought against the state.118 The legislature enacted
North Dakota Century Code section 32-12.2-04(5), which states that an
action involving a contract or title to property may be brought in district
court by delivering a copy of the summons, complaint, or other legal
pleading to the director of the office of management and budget.119 This is
in addition to any applicable rule of civil procedure.120
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 4 provides the manner-volun-
tary appearance or service of process-to obtain personal jurisdiction over
the State.' 2' In this case there was neither a voluntary appearance nor statu-
tory service.1 22 North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2)(f) requires
personal service to be made upon the State by delivering a copy of the
summons to the head of the agency or to the attorney general.123 Personal
jurisdiction requires service of process.124 The State could not have con-
sented to suit without proper service. 125 Because there was not service, and
therefore no personal jurisdiction, the court did not examine whether there
was subject matter jurisdiction. 126
Next, the defendants asserted that they were entitled to recognition of
the tribal court's order as a matter of comity.127 In determining comity, a
foreign judgment is prima facie evidence of the truth of the matter asserted
and should be held conclusive unless some special ground is shown to
116. Id.




121. Id. [ 10, 627 N.W.2d at 155-56.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. [ 11, 627 N.W.2d at 156 (citing Helmers v. Sortino, 545 N.W.2d 796, 799 (N.D.
1996)).
125. Id. 1 12.
126. Id. 13 n.1.
127. Id. 14. Comity is a nation's voluntary recognition and execution of another nation's
laws where rights of individuals are concerned. Id. (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1985)).
[VOL. 78:579
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impeach judgment.128 The court stated that in order for a tribal court judg-
ment or order to be recognized as a matter of comity, the tribal court must
have had personal and subject matter jurisdiction.129 Because the court had
concluded there was no personal jurisdiction over the State, the tribal
court's order was not entitled comity. 130
The defendants' last argument was that the trial court erred in denying
summary judgment because of the State's failure to exhaust its tribal court
remedies.' 3' The court stated that the law generally requires that a party
challenging a tribal court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction exhaust
its tribal court remedies before challenging the tribal court's jurisdiction in
federal court.132 However, the court stated the considerations attached to
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction were not implicated in the case in
question because the question was whether the tribal court lacked personal
jurisdiction.133 The court concluded that the State was not required to ex-
haust its available remedies in tribal court and affirmed the district court's
order and judgment. 134
CIVIL RIGHTS-RIGHTS PROTECTED
NORTH DAKOTA FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL, INC. V. PETERSON
In North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Peterson,135 the North
Dakota Supreme Court was asked to decide whether refusing to rent to an
unmarried couple seeking to cohabit violated the discriminatory housing
practices provision of the North Dakota Human Rights Act. 136 The North
Dakota Supreme Court determined that given the words contained in the
statute; the rules of statutory construction; and legislative, administrative,
and judicial history, the Petersons did not act unlawfully in refusing to rent
to an unmarried couple seeking to cohabit.137
In 1999, Robert Kippen and Patricia DePoe tried to rent a dwelling
from David and Mary Peterson.138 The Petersons refused to rent Kippen
128. Id. 1 15, 627 N.W.2d at 157 (citing Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury,
Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 167 (N.D. 1990)).
129. Id. 9[ 16.
130. Id.
131. Id. 9117,627 N.W.2d at 158.
132. Id. E 18 (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) and Nat'l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 849 (1985)).
133. Id. T 19.
134. Id. 19-20, 627 N.W.2d at 158-59.
135. 2001 ND 81, 625 N.W.2d 551.
136. Peterson, 1 1,625 N.W.2d at 553.
137. Id. 9[ 49, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
138. Id. 9[ 2, 625 N.W.2d at 553.
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and DePoe the dwelling because they were not married and sought to
cohabit.139 In April of the same year the couple married.140 Shortly there-
after, on August 26, 1999, the North Dakota Fair Housing Council (Hou-
sing Council) and the Kippens brought a housing discrimination suit against
the Petersons. 141 The Petersons immediately moved to dismiss the Housing
Council from the action, claiming it lacked standing because it was not a
party in interest. 142 The district court granted the motion. 143
Following the dismissal of the Housing Council, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Petersons.144 The district court
concluded that North Dakota public policy disfavored cohabitation, and
thus, the Petersons were entitled to deny housing to the Kippens. 145
The North Dakota Supreme Court began by looking at the legislative
history of the statutes at issue.146 North Dakota has prohibited cohabitation
since statehood.147 The language prohibiting such conduct had not changed
until the drafting of the new criminal code in 1973.148 The current language
contained in North Dakota Century Code section 12.1-20-10 provides: "A
person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he or she lives openly and
notoriously with a person of the opposite sex as a married couple without
being married to the other person."149 The court also looked at the 1983
adoption of the North Dakota Human Rights Act. 50 At the time of the
Human Rights Act's passage, the legislative history did not contain any
discussion of the cohabitation statute and the possible conflicts. ' 5'
Given the historical background and the "presumption against repeal-
ing or amending legislation," the court attempted to harmonize the different
statutes and still give the legislative intent full effect.152 The court was able
139. Id.






146. Id. 9 10, 625 N.W.2d at 555.
147. Id.
148. Id. 9111, 625 N.W.2d at 555-56.
149. Id. 9 7, 625 N.W.2d at 554. The passing of the current law against cohabitation
underwent much debate given the sexual nature of the offense. Id. 12, 625 N.W.2d at 556.
150. Id. 9113.
151. Id. The relevant portion of the North Dakota Human Rights Act provided: "It is dis-
criminatory practice for an owner of rights to housing or real property ... to: 1. refuse to transfer
an interest in real property or housing accommodation to a person because of. . . status with
respect to marriage." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (1997 & Supp. 2001) (repealed by S.L.
1999, ch. 134, § 4).
152. N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 2001 ND 81, 36, 625 N.W.2d 551, 561.
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to accomplish this by recognizing that "the cohabitation statute regulates
conduct, not status."
153
It is unlawful to openly and notoriously live together as husband
and wife without being married. It is unlawful to deny housing
based on a person's status with respect to marriage (i.e., married,
single, divorced, widowed, or separated). It is not unlawful to
deny housing to an unmarried couple seeking to openly and
notoriously live together as husband and wife. 154
The court determined that harmony between the two statutes could be main-
tained insofar as the statutes attempted to prohibit kinds of conduct and not
status. 155
The court further bolstered this opinion by citing an attorney general's
opinion issued on the same matter in 1990.156 During the time between the
formal attorney general's opinion and the facts that led to this case, the
court noted that five legislative sessions had passed and only one of them
had considered the issue. 157 The court found it clear that the legislature had
knowledge of the possible statutory conflict. 58 Lending further weight to
the decision, the court noted a federal district court decision on the
matter. 159 Although the court explained that such a decision by a federal
district court was in no way binding, the decision was reviewed as if based
upon sound reasoning.160
Justice Kapsner dissented, finding the courts awarding of summary
judgment presumed, without evidence, that the Kippens violated the cohabi-
tation statute. 161 Because the majority determined the Petersons' refusal to
rent to the Kippens punished conduct and not status, Justice Kapsner argued
proof of a violation was needed to award summary judgment. 162
153. Id. 9 37, 625 N.W.2d at 562. This decision was also reached by courts in Michigan,
Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Id. 38.
154. Id. 38.
155. Id. 9 28, 38, 625 N.W.2d at 560, 562.
156. Id. 42, 625 N.W.2d at 562.
157. Id. 43, 625 N.W.2d at 562-63. The legislature voted not to repeal the cohabitation
statute in 1991. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. R 45, 625 N.W.2d at 563.
160. Id.
161. Id. 9 53, 625 N.W.2d at 564 (Kapsner, J., dissenting).
162. Id. 9 54.
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COMMERCIAL LAW-IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
EGGL V. LETVIN EQUIPTMENT CO.
In Eggl v. Letvin Equipment Co.,163 Letvin Equipment Company (Let-
vin) appealed a judgment for Garth Eggl in a suit involving the purchase of
a defective used tractor. 164 Eggl also cross-appealed the amount of
damages.165 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court. 1
66
Eggl purchased a used tractor from Letvin in November 1996 for
$47,500.167 The tractor stalled in the field when Eggl attempted to use it in
the fall of 1997, and Eggl had to bring it into the Devils Lake Equipment
Company for repairs.168 Eggl next tried to use the tractor in 1998, and it
again stalled in the field after he had used it for only two hundred hours.1
69
He returned the tractor to the Devils Lake Equipment Company for more
in-depth repairs. 170
Eggl then brought suit against Letvin for breach of implied and express
warranties, fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit.171 The trial court found
that wrong sized o-rings had been put into the tractor prior to Eggl's acqui-
sition, that the o-ring defect breached the implied warranties of merchanta-
bility and fitness for a particular purpose, and that two farming seasons
were a reasonable amount of time to discover the defect. 172 Subsequently,
the trial court awarded Eggl $11,925.78 in damages for the cost of the
second repairs and $2,044.92 for trial costs.
173
Letvin argued (1) the trial court's finding that it breached the implied
warranty of merchantability was clearly erroneous; (2) the finding that the
wrong sized o-rings were installed in the tractor and caused Eggl's
problems was clearly erroneous; (3) operating the tractor for more than 160
hours and six months was beyond a reasonable time to discover the defect;
and (4) the court erred in finding Letvin was liable for the defective o-rings
regardless of whether Letvin or the manufacturer installed them. 7 4 On
163. 2001 ND 144, 632 N.W.2d 435.
164. Eggl, 1,632 N.W.2d at 437.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. 9 2. The tractor was a 1985 John Deere 4850 tractor used for farming. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.




173. Id. 9 3-4, 632 N.W.2d at 438.
174. Id. 915.
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cross-appeal, Eggl argued that he should have also received damages for the
cost of the first repairs.'
75
The North Dakota Supreme Court first addressed Letvin's challenge to
the trial court's finding that it breached the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility.176 The court applied Uniform Commercial Code section 2-314,
which creates an implied warranty of merchantability whenever "the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."177 Letvin met the mer-
chant requirement, and the only remaining question was whether the goods
were merchantable. 7 8 For a good to be merchantable it must be fit for its
ordinary purpose. 179 The court relied on the record testimony of Kelly Foll-
man, a tractor mechanic for Devils Lake Equipment Company, to determine
whether the tractor was fit for its ordinary purpose.180 Follman testified that
the tractor should have easily pulled the load Eggl had attached to it and
that the o-rings in the tractor's transmission were defective. 181 Consequent-
ly, the court concluded the trial court's finding that Letvin breached the
implied warranty of merchantability was not clearly erroneous. 
182
Next, the court considered Letvin's claim that it had not placed the
wrong sized o-rings in the tractor's transmission and the o-rings had not
caused the tractor's problems.183 The record provided conflicting views,
from both Follman' 84 and David Hoesel, Letvin's service manager, regard-
175. Id.
176. Id. 7.
177. Id. 9 8. Uniform Commercial Code section 2-314 is codified in the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-31 (1999). North Dakota Century Code section 41-02-31
states:
I. Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that goods shall be merchantable is
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods
of that kind...
2. Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as:
c. Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.
Id.
178. Eggl v. Letvin Equip. Co., 2001 ND 144, 8-9, 632 N.W.2d 435, 438-39.
179. Id. (R 8.
180. Id. 9 9, 632 N.W.2d at 439.
181. Id. 9 11.
182. Id. 9 13, 632 N.W.2d at 440.
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law,
if there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it,
on the entire we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.
Id. [ 6, 632 N.W.2d at 438 (citing Schmitz v. Schmitz, 2001 ND 19, 9 7, 622 N.W.2d 176, 178).
183. Id. ( 10, 632 N.W.2d at 439.
184. Id. 9 11. Kelly Follman, a mechanic with Devils Lake Equipment Company, testified
that the o-rings were cut and that the cut would cause the tractor to "stop or stall." Id. Follman
also gave his opinion that the o-rings would not naturally wear out that way. Id. at 440.
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ing the cause of the tractor's defect. 85 The court found sufficient evidence
to support a finding of defective o-rings and noted that a trial court's choice
of one of two permissible views does not make its decision clearly
erroneous. 
186
Letvin also argued that operating the tractor for more than 160 hours
and six months was not within a reasonable amount of time to discover a
defect existing at the time of sale.187 North Dakota Century Code section
51-07-07 allows anyone purchasing a tractor for his or her own use to have
a reasonable amount of time after delivery to inspect the tractor, and if the
purchaser determines the tractor is not fit for its ordinary purpose, the
purchaser may rescind the contract. 188 This statute also makes any contract
clause contrary to the statute's provisions void by public policy.189 Al-
though the statute only provided for rescission, the court explained that
once a disclaimer of warranty is voided (in this case by statute), the com-
mercial code injects an implied warranty of merchantability into the
contract for sale.190 The commercial code requires a purchaser who accepts
goods to give notice of any defects to the seller within a reasonable time
after the purchaser discovers or should have discovered the defect. 191
After establishing the reasonable time requirement, the court had to
determine what amount of time constituted a reasonable amount of time in
this case. 192 Examining all the circumstances, the court referred to Capitol
Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Northern Concrete Pipe,193 which determined that a
reasonable time to inspect under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-606
must be a period that affords the purchaser an opportunity to put the product
to its intended use. 194 The court also cited decisions regarding the use of a
combine for two harvest seasons, 195 a computer system for more than two
years, 96 and a tractor for eight months that determined the defects were dis-
185. Id. 12. David Hoesel testified that the split o-rings were not improper, that the o-rings
did not cause the problem, and that a faulty transmission pump was the source of the problem. Id.
186. Id. 113 (citing Hurt v. Hurt, 2001 ND 13, 16, 621 N.W.2d 326, 331).
187. Id. 14.
188. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-07 (Supp. 2001) (repealed by S.L. 2001, ch. 447, § 7); Eggl
v. Letvin Equip. Co., 2001 ND 144, 15, 632 N.W.2d 435, 440-41.
189. Eggl, f 15, 632 N.W.2d at 440. "Any provision in any written order or contract of sale,
or other contract, which is contrary to any of the provisions of this section, hereby is declared to
be against public policy and void." Id.
190. Id. 116,632 N.W.2d at 441.
191. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-71(2) (1999) (codifying Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
608).
192. Eggl, 17-19, 632 N.W.2d at 441-42.
193. 346 N.W.2d 535 (Mich. App. 1983).
194. Capitol Dodge Sales, Inc., 346 N.W.2d at 539.
195. J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. Stark, 392 P.2d 215, 221 (Wash. 1964).
196. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Alsip, 880 F.2d 247, 249 (10th Cir. 1989).
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covered within a reasonable time. 197 Given the cited decisions and the few
hours of tractor use, the court determined the trial court's finding of "within
a reasonable time limit for discovery" was not clearly erroneous. 198
Letvin also claimed the trial court erred in concluding that it did not
matter whether the manufacturer or Letvin had installed the defective o-
rings. 199 The court rejected this argument by citing Troutman v. Pierce,200
which interpreted North Dakota Century Code section 41-02-71 (Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-608) as giving a buyer a right to revoke
acceptance of goods regardless of whether the seller or the manufacturer
caused the defect.2 01
Finally, the court could not find any supportive reasoning or precedent
for Eggl's cross-appeal.2 02 Eggl wanted to recover for the cost of the first
repairs, but the court found his claim was without merit and affirmed the
trial court's decision to award only damages for the cost of the second
repairs.203
COMMERCIAL LAW-LANDLORD AND TENANT
T.F. JAMES Co. v. VOKACH
T.F. James Co. v. Vakoch (James 11)204 was the second appeal by T.F.
James Co. (James). 205 James is the owner and operator of the Jamestown
Mall in Jamestown, North Dakota.206 Vakoch leased space from James and
then abandoned the leased space. 207 At the initial trial, the district court
found that Vakoch breached the lease agreement, which included a
provision for payment of attorney fees to James upon a breach by Vakoch,
but that the lease agreement was usurious.208 In the first appeal to the North
Dakota Supreme Court (James I), the court held the lease agreement was
not usurious. 2 09 Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded to "the
197. Dwinnell v. Boehmer, 234 N.W. 655, 658 (N.D. 1931).
198. Eggl v. Letvin Equip. Co., 2001 ND 144, f 20, 632 N.W.2d 435, 442.
199. Id. 21.
200. 402 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1987).
201. Troutman, 402 N.W.2d at 922-23; see also Eggl, 21, 632 N.W.2d at 442.
202. Eggl, 23, 632 N.W.2d at 442.
203. Id. Eggl unsuccessfully claimed that he should not have to bear the burden of the first
repairs because he did not cause the repair problems. Id.
204. 2001 ND 112, 628 N.W.2d 298.
205. James 1I, 3, 628 N.W.2d at 300.
206. Id. ( 2, 628 N.W.2d at 299.
207. Id.
208. Id. Usurious typically refers to the charging of an illegal rate of interest on a contract.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999).
209. James /, 91 2. 628 N.W.2d at 299 (citing T.F. James Co. v. Vakoch (James 1), 2000 ND
9, 911, 604 N.W.2d 459, 459).
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district court ... to reconsider its decision not to award James attorney fees
in light of the fact the lease [was] not usurious."210
On remand, the district court held that the agreement provision
allowing James to recover attorney fees in the event of Vakoch's breach of
the agreement was void because it violated public policy according to
section 28-26-04 of the North Dakota Century Code.211 James appealed
this decision and the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
concluding that the district court abused its discretion in its decision not to
allow recovery of attorney fees.212 The court also directed the district court
to award reasonable attorney fees to James. 213
The court, citing North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-01(1),
stated that parties are usually able to enter into agreements allowing
recovery of attorney fees in a civil action. 214 However, there are circum-
stances where these types of agreements are void as against public
policy.215 Under North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04, provisions
for payment of attorney fees are void against public policy when contained
in notes, bonds, mortgages, security agreements, or other evidence of
debt.216 The court relied on persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to
determine how "evidence of debt" is defined. 217
The court discussed an Ohio Supreme Court decision where that court
concluded personal leases were not in the same class as "bonds, certificates
of indebtedness, debentures and notes; certificates of deposit .... and other
similar evidences of indebtedness."218 The court also cited a Sixth Circuit
case which held evidence of indebtedness only referred "to instruments of
the same general nature as bonds, mortgages, notes, and debentures with
which they are associated." 219 The court also cited a Georgia Court of
210. Id. 3, 628 N.W.2d at 300 (quoting James I, 12, 604 N.W.2d at 462).
211. Id. T 5. North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 reads as follows:
Attorney's fee in instrument void. Any provision contained in any note, bond, mort-
gage, security agreement, or other evidence of debt for the payment of an attorney's
fee in case of default in payment or in proceedings had to collect such note, bond, or
evidence of debt, or to foreclose such mortgage or security agreement, is against
public policy and void.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (1991).
212. James II, 9 1,628 N.W.2d at 299.
213. Id.
214. Id. 91 6, 628 N.W.2d at 300.
215. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04).
216. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (emphasis added).
217. James H, 7,628 N.W.2d at 301.
218. Id. T 8 (citing Columbus & S. Ohio Elec. Co. v. Peck, 118 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Ohio 1954)
(emphasis added by North Dakota Supreme Court)).
219. Id. T 9,628 N.W.2d at 301-02 (citing Hiller v. Olmstead, 54 F.2d 5, 7 (6th Cir. 1931)).
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Appeals case where the Georgia court refused to recognize a contract for
the sale of a business as evidence of indebtedness.220 The court accepted
these interpretations of "evidence of a debt."221 Accordingly, it decided that
a commercial lease was different than a mortgage, security agreement,
bond, note, or loan agreement, all of which are evidence of a debt. 222
The court stated that lease agreements are not transformed into
"evidence of debt" simply because a term in those agreements requires one
party to pay attorney fees in the event of a breach.223 If the opposite were
true, any contract could demonstrate evidence of a debt.224 The court
ultimately held "evidence of debt" instruments are those instruments that
are written and import "on [their] face the existence of debt, an
acknowledgment of that debt, and a promise of payment." 225
James also argued that a new district court judge should be assigned on
remand because the current district court judge was "subconsciously
biased."226 The court stated that even though the district court incorrectly
denied the fees two times, it was confident the district court would fairly
decide the matter on remand. 227 "The purpose of reassignment is ... to
preserve the integrity of the court, to protect litigants from bias, and to
ensure that allegations of prejudice do not affect the fair administration of
the law." 228
The court provided explicit direction to the district court for its deter-
mination of attorney fees on remand. 229 It ordered the district court to
award reasonable attorney fees and costs on both appeals. 230 It also ordered
the district court to apply the lodestar method to determine attorney fees.231
The court listed the factors for determining the reasonableness of attorney
fees as found in North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) to aid
220. Id. 1 10, 628 N.W.2d at 302 (citing O'Brien's Irish Pub, Inc. v. Gerlew Holdings, Inc.,
332 S.E.2d 920, 923 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)). The Georgia Court of Appeals stated that a note is a
"written paper acknowledging a debt and promising payment" and that a- contract for sale of a
business is not a "note or other evidence of indebtedness." Id.
221. Id. ' 7,628 N.W.2d at 301.
222. Id. 13, 628 N.W.2d at 302-03.




227. Id. at 303-04.
228. Id. 18, 628 N.W.2d at 304.
229. Id. [ 20.
230. Id. 121.
231. Id. 1 23, 628 N.W.2d at 305. The lodestar method is calculated by multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. (citing City of Medora v.
Golberg, 1997 ND 190, 9 19-22, 569 N.W.2d 257, 561-62).
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the district court. 232 Finally, the court ordered that after applying the lode-
star method, the attorney fees could not be reduced by considering any
other factors. 233
CRIMINAL LAW-CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON- KIDNAPPING
STATE V. SHAFER-IMHOFF
Following a nine-year marriage, Lars Imhoff (Imhoff) and Kathlene
Shafer-Imhoff (Shafer) were divorced.234 Mr. Imhoff was granted custody
of the couple's two children while Ms. Shafer was given visitation rights,
including extended visitation in the summer months. 235 Sometime during
the second summer visitation, Shafer took the children out of the United
States to London, England.2 36 Subsequently, she was convicted by a jury
on two counts of removing a child from the state in violation of North
Dakota Century Code section 14-14-22.1.237 Shafer was sentenced to five
years imprisonment for each count, ordered to pay restitution, and ordered
to pay a court fine.238
At trial, the district court excluded evidence of physical assaults on Ms.
Shafer by unknown third parties.239 Schafer appealed the trial court's ex-
clusion of the evidence, claiming the evidence was relevant to the element
of intent.240 Shafer further contended that the trial court abused its discre-
tion when it required the parties to make additional closing arguments prior
to the jury indicating it was at an impasse in its deliberations. 241 Shafer also
claimed that the trial court should have given the jury instructions she
requested as suggested in the explanatory note of North Dakota Rules of
Court 6.9 and that the trial court's comments to the jury were an abuse of
discretion. 242 Finally, Shafer appealed her prison sentence, asserting that
232. Id. at 304-05.
233. Id. at 305.
234. State v. Shafer-Imhoff, 2001 ND 146, 2, 632 N.W.2d 825, 828.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. ( 6, 632 N.W.2d at 828-29; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-22.1 (1997 & Supp.
2001) (repealed by S.L. 1999, ch. 147, § 3). Intentionally removing one's own child who is under
eighteen years old outside North Dakota with the intent to deny another person's rights under an
existing custody decree was in violation of North Dakota Century Code section 14-14-22.1. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-14-22.1
238. Shafer-Imhoff, 9 7, 632 N.W.2d at 829.
239. Id. ( 3, 632 N.W.2d at 828.
240. Id.
241. Id. 1 14, 632 N.W.2d at 830.
242. Id.
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North Dakota law extinguished imprisonment for a repealed statute.243 The
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the verdicts, but remanded the case to
the trial court for re-sentencing.244
Shafer argued that the evidence of physical assaults committed by un-
known assailants was relevant and should have been admitted to prove that
her intent was to protect her children and not to deny Imhoff's rights. 245
Because the alleged assaults were not directed at the children and the evi-
dence had the potential to unfairly prejudice and mislead the jury, the court
determined that it was not relevant to any element of the charge and was
properly excluded by the trial court.246
Following approximately two hours of deliberations, the jury indicated
that it could not reach a verdict; at this point, the trial court directed the jury
to continue deliberations and read a special jury instruction.247 Several
questions were later posed to the court by the jury, and upon providing
answers, the trial court excused the jury members for the evening, informed
them that the parties would make additional closing arguments in the morn-
ing, and commented, "I've got all eight days [for the trial]. It won't be a
problem for me."248
The next morning Shafer objected to the additional closing arguments,
asserting there was no indication that a second impasse had occurred to
require the additional closings. 249 Shafer requested further specific jury
instructions listed in the comments of the North Dakota Rules of Court 6.9
and objected to the trial court's comments that the jury could stay for all
eight days. 250 The trial court overruled the objections, and the supreme
court upheld the decision, stating there was no requirement that a second
indication of impasse from the jury was necessary to allow additional
closing arguments. 251 Because the trial court followed the suggestions out-
lined in the first part of North Dakota Rules of Court 6.9, there was no error
243. Id. 1 28, 632 N.W.2d at 833. Referred to as a savings statute, North Dakota Century
Code section 1-02-17 "saves" the non-prison punishment for a statutory violation that was com-
mitted prior to the repeal of that statute. Id. 31. The punishment is saved from the common law
doctrine of abatement, where punishment for a crime committed prior to the repeal of a statute
was abated, and therefore, could not be punished under the repealed statute. Id.
244. Id. 1, 632 N.W.2d at 828.
245. Id. 9, 632 N.W.2d at 829.
246. Id. 1 13, 632 N.W.2d at 830.
247. Id. 15.
248. Id. 16-17, 632 N.W.2d at 830-31.
249. Id. 18, 632 N.W.2d at 831.
250. Id.
251. Id. IT 18, 24, 632 N.W.2d at 831, 832.
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in requiring the parties to add to their closing arguments regarding the issue
that the jury had questions about.252
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the trial court did
not err when it failed to read the exact jury instructions requested by Shafer
because its instructions adequately and correctly informed the jury of the
applicable law. 253 The instructions in the explanatory note of North Dakota
Rules of Court 6.9 are merely suggestions and are not required. 254 The trial
court's comments to the jury were likewise not in error. 255 Employing the
totality of the circumstances test, the court did not believe "intelligent and
honest men could have been influenced by the remarks of the trial court to
bring in a verdict contrary to their sense of duty."256
Finally, Shafer appealed the prison sentence she received claiming that
North Dakota's saving statute did not save the penalty of imprisonment
once the statute imposing the penalty had been repealed.2 57 Shafer took her
children out of the state in July of 1998 and North Dakota Century Code
section 14-14-22.1, criminalizing the removal of a child from the state in
violation of a custody decree, was repealed in August of 1999, prior to
Shafer's conviction. 258 The trial court agreed that the statute had been re-
pealed, but concluded that the saving statute was an unconstitutional
exercise of the legislature to pardon, a power reserved exclusively to the
governor. 259
The court disagreed with this interpretation stating that the situation in
Ex parte Chambers,260 relied on by the trial court to invalidate the statute,
was substantially different.261 In Chambers, the saving statute had been
amended by the legislature two years after Chambers was convicted on
another matter. 262 Therefore, the saving statute did not apply because it
would have extinguished the prison sentence of a criminal convicted prior
to its amendment and would have constituted an infringement on the
exclusive pardon power of the governor.263 The saving statute at issue in
252. Id. 91 24, 632 N.W.2d at 832. North Dakota Rules of Court 6.9 provides in part that
after receiving the jurors written response, the judge may direct further proceedings to occur as
appropriate. N.D. R. CT. 6.9.
253. State v. Shafer-Imhoff, 2001 ND 146, 9 25, 632 N.W.2d 825, 832-33.
254. Id. at 832.
255. Id. 27, 632 N.W.2d at 833.
256. Id.
257. Id. T9[ 28-29.
258. Id. 9 30-31, 632 N.W.2d at 833-34.
259. Id. 9 33-36, 632 N.W.2d at 834-36.
260. 285 N.W. 862 (N.D. 1939).
261. State v. Shafer-Imhoff, 2001 ND 146, 34, 632 N.W.2d 825, 835.
262. Id. 9 35.
263. Id. 9 38, 632 N.W.2d at 836.
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this case was in place before Shafer's crime and conviction and extin-
guished the penalty of imprisonment only up until the time.of conviction. 264
Because Shafer had not been convicted when the saving statute ex-
tinguished the imprisonment penalty, there was not an unconstitutional
legislative pardon of the sentence. 265
The court reaffirmed the general rule that statutes are not retroactive,
with the narrow exception of ameliorating penal legislation, unless express-
ly declared so by the legislature. 266 The court found a "compelling infer-
ence" that the legislature intended, despite the absence of an express
declaration, ameliorating legislation be retroactive. 267 The ameliorating
statute can be applied to offenses committed prior to its effective date so
long as the defendant has not yet been finally convicted of the offense. 268
The legislature can retroactively ameliorate imprisonment prior to final con-
viction without infringing on the governor's exclusive power to pardon. 269
The court affirmed the trial court's determination that the child removal
statute was repealed and replaced with another statute rather than merely
amended. 270 The saving statute does not apply to an amended statute, and
therefore, the doctrine of abatement would have precluded the trial court
from imposing any penalty. 27' Because the child removal statute was
repealed, the court determined that the saving statute applied. 272
Shafer's final claim was that the criminal prosecution for removal of
her children was contrary to the legislature's intent and federal law.273
Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent is presumed
from the face of the statute. 274 Because the statute was unambiguous, the
court determined that the legislature intended to penalize a defendant for
removing a child from the state with the intent to deny another person's
rights under an existing custody decree. 275
264. Id. 39.
265. Id.
266. Id. 43, 632 N.W.2d at 837.
267. Id. 42. The court stated that there was a compelling inference that the legislature, by
reducing the mandatory minimum penalty for a driving offense from fifteen days to four days
incarceration, determined the former penalty was too harsh and the shorter penalty was more
appropriate. Id. 43.
268. Id.
269. Id. ( 45, 632 N.W.2d at 837-38.
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CRIMINAL LAW-IMPLIED CONSENT
WETZEL V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Wetzel v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,276 the North
Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) appealed the district
court's reversal of the Department's revocation of Wetzel's driver's license
for refusing to submit to a chemical test.277 After his arrest for driving
under the influence, Wetzel received an implied consent advisory and was
asked to submit to a chemical test. 278  Wetzel stated that he did not
understand the advisory, particularly the "legal language" it contained. 279
Wetzel asked to call his wife and later, his attorney. 280 During this period,
Wetzel was also complaining about his job and his life.281 After a period in
which Wetzel called his wife and tried, but failed, to contact a lawyer, he
was asked by the police officer if he understood the advisory.282 Wetzel
answered that he did, but he still wanted to talk to a lawyer.2 83 The police
officer told Wetzel that any answer other than consent to the test was a
refusal. 284 Wetzel stated again that he wanted to talk to an attorney.285 The
police officer told Wetzel he had refused the chemical test.286
On the way to jail, the police officer gave Wetzel one more chance to
take the test, but told him that any answer other than "yes" to the test was a
refusal. 287 Wetzel told the police officer he wanted an attorney so the
police officer deemed Wetzel's response a refusal, and after the officer
issued his report, Wetzel was notified of the Department's intent to revoke
his driving privileges. 288 Wetzel asked for an administrative hearing on the
proposed revocation. 289 The Department determined that Wetzel was given
a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and revoked his driving
privileges. 290 On appeal to the district court, the court determined that
276. 2001 ND 35,622 N.W.2d 180.
277. Wetzel, 1,622 N.W.2d at 181.
278. Id. 9 2.
279. Id. at 181-82.




284. Id. 9 5.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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Wetzel did not receive a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney
before taking the chemical test and therefore did not refuse the test.291
The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the agency's record with
great deference to decide whether a reasonable mind could have determined
that the factual conclusions were proven by the weight of the evidence. 292
The court recognized that there is a limited statutory right to consult with an
attorney before having to submit to a chemical test.293 If a driver is unsuc-
cessful in contacting an attorney within a reasonable amount of time, the
driver must choose to either submit to or refuse the test.294 The court
balances the driver's right to consult with an attorney with the state's
interest in collecting important evidence. 295 The test is objective and the
court considers the totality of circumstances in determining whether the
opportunity to consult an attorney was reasonable.296
After an arrest, a police officer has two hours to perform a chemical
test.297 When the officer determined Wetzel had refused the test, one hour
remained during which it could have been performed. 298 Wetzel argued
that because he had one more hour to take the chemical test, the twenty-five
minutes he was given to contact an attorney was not reasonable. 299 The
court disagreed and declined to fix a certain amount of time for contacting
an attorney because facts will differ from case to case. 300 Wetzel next
invited the court to adopt the nonexclusive factors applied by Minnesota. 301
The factors include "whether the driver made a good faith and sincere effort
to contact an attorney, the time of day when the driver [was] trying to
contact an attorney, and the length of time the driver [had] been under
291. Id. ( 8,622 N.W.2d at 183.
292. Id. 91 9.
293. Id. 12 (citing Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987)
and N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 39-20 (1997 & Supp. 2001)).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 184.
297. Id. 9 15.
298. Id. 9 14.
299. Id. The court reviewed Boyce v. Backes, 488 N.W.2d 45, 47 (N.D. 1992), where the
defendant argued that the statutory two hours must be the benchmark for reasonability. Id. 9 16.
The court disagreed, stating that to put the standard at the maximum amount of time would
"unduly delay and extend the booking, observation, and testing processes." Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. S 17 (citing Kuhn v. Comm'r of Public Safety, 488 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992)).
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arrest." 302 The court declined to adopt a list of factors because it preferred
the flexibility of the totality of the circumstances test.303
The court applied the totality of the circumstances test and determined
that a reasonable mind could certainly have found that Wetzel was afforded
reasonable time to contact an attorney because he was given twenty-five
minutes to make contact; he made six calls, including two to his wife; the
police officer provided a phone for his use; and he wasted time by talking
about his life when he should have been trying to contact an attorney. 304
The court concluded that Wetzel's limited statutory right to contact an
attorney was not denied.305
CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE OFFENDERS
IN RE A.B.
In In re A.B.,306 the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the
Morton County Juvenile Court violated North Dakota Century Code section
27-20-12(1) by failing to transfer proceedings, which involved A.B.'s es-
cape from the North Dakota Youth Correctional Center, to the Grand Forks
County Juvenile Court. 307 The court affirmed the Morton County Juvenile
Court's finding that A.B. committed delinquent acts, reversed the order
rendering final disposition, and remanded the case for transfer to the Grand
Forks County Juvenile Court.308
A.B. had escaped twice from the North Dakota Youth Correctional
Center in Morton County. 309 A petition was filed in the Morton County
Juvenile Court alleging escape, unlawful entry into a motor vehicle, and
302. Id. (citing Kuhn, 488 N.W.2d at 842).
303. Id. 1 19, 622 N.W.2d at 185. The court noted that North Dakota's right to consult an
attorney is a limited statutory right and Minnesota's right to consult is a limited constitutional
right. Id. ' 18 (citing Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987) and
Friedman v. Comm'r of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991)).
304. Id. 20.
305. Id. 27, 622 N.W.2d at 186.
306. 2001 ND 111,627 N.W.2d 776.
307. In re A.B., 1, 627 N.W.2d at 776. The North Dakota Century Code states:
Transfer to another juvenile court within the state.
1. If the child resides in a county of the state and the proceeding is commenced in a
court of another county, the court, on motion of a party or on its own motion
made prior to final disposition, may transfer the proceeding to the county of the
child's residence for further action. Like transfer may be made if the residence
of the child changes pending the proceeding. The proceeding must be transferred
if the child has been adjudicated delinquent or unruly and other proceedings in-
volving the child are pending in the juvenile court of the county of his residence).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-12 (1991).
308. In re A.B., 9f 1-2, 627 N.W.2d at 776-77.
309. Id. 1 2, 627 N.W.2d at 777.
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theft.310 At his hearing, A.B. admitted to the escape and admitted he needed
treatment. 311 The juvenile court referee immediately proceeded to a dispo-
sitional hearing and entered an order of final disposition committing A.B. to
the North Dakota Division of Juvenile Services for one year and giving the
Division authority to place him wherever it deemed necessary to be in his
best interests, including out-of-state placement.312
A.B. requested that the order of disposition be set aside and the case be
transferred to the Grand Forks Juvenile Center under section 27-20-12(1) of
the North Dakota Century Code.313 This section provides for the transfer of
a juvenile case to another juvenile court "if the child has been adjudged
delinquent or unruly and other proceedings involving the child are pending
in the juvenile court of the county of his residence." 314 A.B.'s county of
residence was Grand Forks.315
The court noted that the juvenile referee in Morton County had
recognized there was an extension hearing in Grand Forks.316 The court
stated that section 27-20-12(1) was clear and unambiguous, finding that
"[i]f a child has been adjudicated delinquent and other proceedings
involving the child are pending in the juvenile court of the county of the
child's residence, the proceedings must be transferred to that court." 317 The
court held that denying A.B.'s attorney's request to transfer A.B. violated
section 27-20-12(1).318 It affirmed the part of the Morton County Juvenile
Court's order adjudicating A.B. on his own admission, reversed the part of
the order rendering final disposition, and remanded the case for transfer to
the Grand Forks Juvenile Court. 319
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
STATE V. HEITZMANN
On April 19, 2000, a deputy on the Stutsman County Drug Task Force
placed a call to a Valley City police officer, informing him that a pickup
310. Id.
311. Id. 9 3. At the hearing, the prosecutor withdrew other allegations in return for A.B.'s
agreement to admit that he escaped and needed treatment. Id. at 777 n. 1.
312. Id. 9 3.
313. Id. 1 4; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-12 (1991).
314. In re A.B., 2001 ND 111, 9 6, 627 N.W.2d 776, 777-78 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-20-12(1))
315. Id. 9 7,627 N.W.2d at 778.
316. Id. 9[ 8.
317. Id. T 10 (finding that this statutory requirement keeps primary responsibility for a
child's care local and eliminates the possibility of inconsistent and competing orders involving the
same child).
318. Id. 11,627 N.W.2d at 778-79.
319. Id. T 12, 627 N.W.2d at 779.
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driven by Chris Jacobson, whose license was suspended, was driving in the
his direction. 320 The officer initiated a stop and subsequently arrested
Jacobson for driving while his license was suspended. 321 Jacobson, upon
placement in the back of the patrol car, was informed that the vehicle would
be searched.322 At this point, Jacobson informed the officer that an un-
loaded pistol was located in the back of the vehicle and that the passenger in
the vehicle was Craig Heitzmann, who was on probation. 323
The deputy had received information that indicated Heitzmann had
recently received a shipment of drugs. 324 Given past experience with
Heitzmann, the deputy decided he would stay back because he did not want
to agitate Heitzmann by his presence, but he warned the officer to "be
cautious." 325 The officer returned to the vehicle and told Heitzmann he was
going to search the pickup.326 Heitzmann was then asked to step out of the
vehicle. 327 Upon stepping out, Heitzmann was told that he would be patted
down for the safety of both himself and the officer.328
The officer began tapping Heitzmann's pants pockets, and Heitzmann
told the officer there were "Certs" in one pocket and money in the other.329
Throughout this entire ordeal, the officer noticed that Heitzmann was
becoming more nervous at each step.330 The officer noted that one of the
pants pockets contained a "baggy of crushed substance that didn't feel like
Certs." 331 The officer then patted down Heitzmann's jacket pockets, which
contained "a bunch of stuff. 3 3 2 Heitzmann was then asked to take the
contents out of his jacket pockets. 333 Upon complying, Heitzmann took a
couple of steps back and started to go around the front of the pickup.334
The officer responded by grabbing Heitzmann's sleeve.335 This prompted
Heitzmann to tell the officer that there was something in the back of the






326. Id. T 3,632 N.W.2d at 5.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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pickup he wanted to show the officer; however, the officer told him that he
wanted to finish the pat-down first. 336
Continuing to hold on to Heitzmann's arm, the officer tapped a wallet
in Heitzmann's back pocket. 337 The wallet was placed on the hood of the
pickup. 338 The officer continued tapping around the left front pocket and
removed a large amount of money. 339 At this point, the officer motioned
for the deputy to come over.34 Heitzmann then pulled away and began
running.341 The officer ran after Heitzmann and caught him in the middle
of the street.342 Shortly after being placed into handcuffs, Heitzmann yelled
that his wallet contained crank. 343 Heitzmann was charged with possession
of a controlled substance, a class C felony. 344
Before trial, Heitzmann moved to suppress the methamphetamine
found in his wallet. 345 The trial court denied the suppression motion, deter-
mining that the officer "acted reasonably in conducting a pat-down search
of the defendant in an effort to complete his search of the automobile
without fear that the defendant was armed and dangerous." 346 Heitzmann
entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of
his suppression motion. 347
The North Dakota Supreme Court began by reviewing whether Heitz-
mann's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when he was asked to step
out of the vehicle. 348 The court identified two grounds that justify a pas-
senger being removed from a vehicle that formerly contained an arrestee. 349
First, the safety of both the officer and passenger warrant the brief intru-
sion.350 Second, officers are entitled to search the passenger compartment













348. Id. 10, 632 N.W.2d at 6-7.
349. Id. (citing State v. Gilberts, 497 N.W.2d 93, 95 (N.D. 1993)).
350. Id. The state's interest in the safety of officers who patrol the roadways outweighs the
minor intrusion on the passenger's liberty. Id.
351. Id. It is necessary and reasonable to have all occupants out of a vehicle to conduct a
thorough search of its passenger compartment. Id.
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determined that Heitzmann's rights were not violated as a result of having
to step out of the pickup. 352
The court then addressed Heitzmann's argument that the pat-down
search of his person was unreasonable. 353 The court began by stating that
no automatic search rule exists for companions of an arrestee. 354 Officers
may conduct pat-down searches only if they "possesses an articulable
suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous." 355  The court
determined the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
Heitzmann may have been dangerous because the officer knew a pistol was
in the pickup and because of Heitzmann's history of becoming "agitated"
and "nervous." 356
The court then explained that going further than a mere pat-down re-
quires more than just a hunch.357 The court found that a reasonable and
articulable suspicion might be fulfilled when a suspect acts in an evasive
manner preventing officers from conducting a full pat-down. 358 The court
concluded that the officer acted reasonably considering Heitzmann's actions
in avoiding being patted-down and the officers' knowledge of a pistol being
present.359 The officers acted upon the belief that Heitzmann may have
been attempting to free himself to gain access to a weapon in the
unsearched pocket.360
The court also rejected Heitzmann's argument that the confrontation
amounted to an illegal arrest without probable cause. 361 The court identi-
fied that no bright-line rule existed to determine when an investigation
became a detention. 362 The court explained that an investigation carries
with it some degree of physical coercion. 363 The court determined that the
trial court did not err in denying Heitzmann's suppression motion and
affirmed the conviction. 364
352. Id. at 7.
353. Id. I 11.
354. Id.
355. Id. (citing State v. Haverluk, 2000 ND 178, 22, 617 N.W.2d 652, 657).
356. Id. S 12, 632 N.W.2d at 7-8.
357. Id. 1 13, 632 N.W.2d at 8. To justify a more extensive search an officer must have had
an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person was armed and dangerous. Id.
358. Id. 91 15, 632 N.W.2d at 8-9.
359. Id. [ 17, 632 N.W.2d at 10.
360. Id. 19.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SEARCH WARRANTS
STATE V. DUCHENE
In early 1998, Game Warden Timothy Larson received information
from an anonymous informant that Daniel Duchene was growing marijuana
in a closet inside his home.365 The warden was informed of Duchene's
activities by telephone; however, the informant did not provide any
information regarding how she knew Duchene or how she was aware of his
activities. 366 The warden then contacted Deputy Lang of the McLean
County Sheriff's Department who, in turn, contacted Deputy Siurek of the
South Sakakawea Narcotics Task Force.367 During a subsequent investiga-
tion, the two deputies discovered two empty potting soil bags, one mari-
juana seed, eight marijuana stems, and a utility bill addressed to Duchene in
his garbage. 368
Subsequently, Deputy Siurek requested a search warrant for Duchene's
home from a magistrate judge. 369 In the affidavit supporting the application
for the warrant, Deputy Siurek stated that Deputy Lang had provided infor-
mation to him that Duchene was growing marijuana in his home. 370 Deputy
Siurek did not inform the magistrate judge that Deputy Lang had received
the information from an anonymous informant. 371 Deputy Siurek included
in his application a list of the items collected from Duchene's trash, as well
as a statement detailing Duchene's prior criminal drug convictions. 372 The
magistrate judge issued a search warrant based on the information contained
in the affidavit.373 The officers, upon searching Duchene's residence,
seized marijuana plants, seeds, drug paraphernalia, and marijuana. 374
Duchene moved to suppress the evidence taken from his home based
on insufficient probable cause to issue the search warrant. 375 The trial court
denied the motion, and a jury subsequently convicted Duchene of manu-
facturing a controlled substance and possessing drug paraphernalia;
Duchene appealed.376




369. Id. 9 4.
370. Id. at 670-7 1.
371. Id. at 671.
372. Id.
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Duchene argued that Deputy Siurek's failure to reveal the anonymous
nature of the informant misled the magistrate judge issuing the warrant.377
The court stated that the misleading statements, if knowingly made or made
with reckless disregard, would be stricken from the affidavit for the
warrant. 378 Upon omitting the misleading information, the court examined
the remaining contents of the affidavit to determine whether there was still
sufficient information to establish probable cause. 379 Employing the totality
of the circumstances test, the court determined there was sufficient infor-
mation to establish probable cause even without the informant's state-
ment. 380 The court stated, "Probable cause to search exists 'if the facts and
circumstances relied on by the magistrate would warrant a person of
reasonable caution to believe the contraband or evidence sought probably
will be found in the place to be searched."' 381
The court distinguished two cases in which the information supporting
the warrant was not specifically consistent with drug activity and could
easily have been explained away as ordinary everyday activity. 382 The
seemingly innocent activities that could not support a search warrant in the
previous cases were not present in Duchene's situation as he had a mari-
juana seeds and marijuana stems in his garbage. 383 These items were
consistent with criminal activity, and although they were not enough to
establish guilt alone, they constituted sufficient probable cause to issue a
search warrant when combined with Duchene's criminal drug history, 384
These circumstances, standing alone, would have provided the magistrate
judge with the necessary information to issue the search warrant.385 The
court determined that excluding the misleading statement would not have
affected the magistrate's decision, and therefore, the trial court's judgments
were affirmed.386
In his dissent, Judge Ronald J. Hilden, sitting in place of disqualified
Justice Sandstrom, stated that the evidence remaining after the misleading
statement was stricken was too tenuous to support probable cause.387 He
377. Id. 7.
378. Id. 8 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978)).
379. Id.
380. Id. 16, 624 N.W.2d at 673.
381. Id. 9 13, 624 N.W.2d at 672 (citing State v. Theiling, 2000 ND 106, 9 7, 611 N.W.2d
861,863).
382. Id. 114, 624 N.W.2d at 672-73.




387. Id. [ 20 (Hilden, J., dissenting).
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stated that the affidavit was incomplete and was only made complete to the
magistrate by supplementing it with the information supplied by the
anonymous informant.388
CRIMINAL LAW- SEARCH AND SEIZURE- SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE
CITY OF WEST FARGO V. ROSS
Ross made an illegal U-turn that was witnessed by a police officer.38 9
The officer performed a record check of the vehicle, which revealed that
Ross, the vehicle's registered owner, had a suspended driver's license.390
The officer then drove alongside of Ross' vehicle and observed that the
driver matched the physical description found on the owner's license.391
The vehicle was stopped and Ross was arrested for driving with a
suspended license. 392  Ross claimed the evidence of driving with a
suspended license was the product of an illegal search and seizure because
the police officer did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a
crime was being committed when the investigatory stop was made.393 The
trial court ruled that the investigatory stop was not based upon reasonable
and articulable suspicion; therefore, it suppressed the evidence that Ross
was driving while his license was suspended. 394
An officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a
motorist has violated or is violating the law in order to legally stop a
vehicle. 395 The standard of reasonable suspicion is an objective one and
"inferences and deductions" made by an investigating officer are consid-
ered. 396 The police are given latitude to assess a situation as it develops and
use their experience and training to make reasoned inferences, deductions,
and conclusions as to whether criminal activity has occurred.397
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the officer had a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring
because a license check verified Ross did not have legal driving privileges,
and the officer directly observed that the driver had a similar appearance to
388. Id. 1 39, 624 N.W.2d at 678.






395. Id. 1 7, 634 N.W.2d at 529 (citing State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, 8, 559 N.W.2d 538,
540).
396. Id. (citing Kenner, 8, 559 N.W.2d at 540 (quoting State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 88
(N.D. 1990))).
397. Id. 8 (citing Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1989)).
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Ross.398 The stop of Ross' vehicle was therefore legal.399 The court
reversed the trial court's finding that the evidence should be suppressed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 400
FAMILY LAW - CHILD CUSTODY - VISITATION
TIBOR V. TIBOR
Kathleen Zich and Bryan Tibor were married in 1986.401 The marriage
produced three children before it resulted in a divorce in 1995.402 The
divorce order granted the parties joint legal and physical custody of the
children. 403 The order also restricted the parties to reside in North Dakota
for five years. 404 After the divorce, both parties remarried. 4 5 Due to down-
sizing, Zich's husband lost his job, and he had to take employment in
Georgia. 406 Zich sought the court's permission to relocate with her children
to Georgia.407 The trial court denied Zich's motion, but on appeal, the
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the trial
court to restructure the visitation schedule.4 08 Upon remand, the trial court
awarded Tibor eight weeks of summer visitation between May 31 and July
31, one week at Christmas, and alternating Easter, Thanksgiving, and spring
break holidays.40 9 The court agreed to allow Tibor to visit the children in
Georgia at any time as long as Zich had one week's notice. 10 The court
ordered the parties to split the costs for visitation, except Tibor had to pay
his own expenses when he visited the children in Georgia.411
Zich motioned the trial court to reconsider, stating that it would be too
expensive to alternate the one-day Easter holiday and that the children
would not have enough time to get prepared for school if they stayed in
North Dakota for eight weeks in the summer.412 Tibor responded by
agreeing that the Easter rotation was too expensive, and requested every
398. Id. 9111.
399. Id. T 12.
400. Id.
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spring break, a reduction in child support by the amount of the travel
expenses, and full responsibility for travel expenses. 41 3
In February 2000, the trial court entered an amended judgment that
eliminated the Easter visitations; shortened the children's summer visitation
in North Dakota to seven weeks; alternated Thanksgiving, Christmas, and
spring breaks; allowed Tibor to visit the children any time in Georgia with a
week's notice; ordered Tibor to pay all the travel expenses; and granted
Tibor a downward deviation in his child support obligation.414 After the
court adjusted the numbers, Tibor submitted his anticipated travel expenses;
the annual amount was $11,372.415 Based on that number, the trial court
reduced Tibor's child support obligation from $995 per month to $50 per
month.4 1
6
On appeal, Zich argued the trial court erred in awarding Tibor seven
weeks of summer visitation.417 North Dakota Century Code section 14-05-
22(2) states a court will grant visitation rights that "will enable the child and
the noncustodial parent to maintain a parent-child relationship that will be
beneficial to the child, unless the court finds . . . visitation is likely to
endanger the child's physical or emotional health."418 North Dakota case
law has endorsed the concept of less frequent but longer visitation sched-
ules when there is a long distance between the custodial and noncustodial
homes. 419 The North Dakota Supreme Court found the trial court order for
seven weeks of visitation in the summer was not clearly erroneous.420
Zich argued the trial court erred when it granted the downward
deviation from the child support guidelines.421 The child support guidelines
are presumptively correct, but may be rebutted by a showing of evidence
that establishes a reduced ability to pay.4 22 If the trial court finds the
presumption rebutted, it must make written findings or specific findings on
the record.4 23 In past cases, courts have allowed downward deviations from
the child support guidelines for visitation travel expenses.424 The North






418. Id. 1 7.
419. Id. g 9-10, 623 N.W.2d at 16.
420. Id. 9 14,623 N.W.2d at 17.
421. Id. ( 15.
422. Id. f 17.
423. Id. at 18.
424. Id. 9[ 18.
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presumptively correct child support guidelines were rebutted due to
evidence of Tibor's reduced ability to provide support because of his
visitation expenses. 425 North Dakota Administrative Code section 75-02-
04.1-09(2)(i) allows for a downward deviation when a preponderance of
rebuttal evidence establishes a reduced ability to provide support due to
travel expenses and when such deviation is in the children's best inter-
ests.426 Because Tibor carried his burden of rebutting the presumptively
correct guidelines and because visitation of the noncustodial parent was
presumed to be in the best interests of the children, the two-pronged test
was met and the trial court did not err in establishing Tibor's reduced ability
to pay.
4 27
However, the supreme court determined that the trial court erred when
it allowed Tibor a downward departure from the guidelines based on
discretionary visits. 428  The trial court reduced Tibor's child support
payments because of his anticipated travel expenses for discretionary
visits. 429 If Tibor made less expensive travel arrangements or did not make
the discretionary trips to visit his children, it would result in a windfall to
him. 430 Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court disallowed all travel
expenses for Tibor's five projected discretionary visits to Georgia and
remanded the case for further calculations. 43'
FAMILY LAW - DIVORCE- PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
HOVERSON V. HOVERSON
In Hoverson v. Hoverson,432 Carl Hoverson appealed the trial's court
judgment and argued that it erred in distributing the parties' property, deter-
mining spousal support, and calculating Carl's child support obligation.4 33
Applying the clearly erroneous standard to the trial court's judgment,434 the
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.4 35
425. Id. J 21, 623 N.W.2d at 19.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. ( 22.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. 91 28, 623 N.W.2d at 20-2 1.
432. 2001 ND 124, 629 N.W.2d 573.
433. Hoverson, 1, 629 N.W.2d at 577.
434. Id. ( 7, 629 N.W.2d at 578.
435. Id. - 1, 629 N.W.2d at 577.
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The Hoversons, Deborah and Carl, married in 1977 and had five child-
ren during the course of their marriage. 36 At the time of the trial, the
children were twenty-three, twenty-one, nineteen, seventeen, and eleven
years old.437 Initially, Carl farmed and Deborah was a homemaker and the
farm's bookkeeper.4 38 In 1994, Carl established a potato farming partner-
ship, Hoverson Farms, LLP, with Ron Offutt, which required continuous
capital contributions. 39 One contribution consisted of Deborah and Carl's
404 shares of American Crystal Stock worth $747,400 and a sixty-acre real
estate lot valued at $60,000.440
After separating in 1997, Deborah remained on the farm and Carl
moved into Grand Forks.441 On May 20, 1997, Deborah initiated this action
seeking a property distribution, spousal support, and child support.an2 At
the time of trial, Deborah had a part-time job where she earned $8.39 per
hour without benefits. 443
The trial court found that the partnership functioned as an ongoing
business and that the value of Carl's share was $524,648. 444 The court also
calculated the parties' net marital estate at $822,185. 445 Further, the trial
court found that Carl had committed economic fault when he transferred the
American Crystal stock and sixty-acre lot to the partnership without
Deborah's consent.an6 The trial court awarded Carl a net property award of
$469,540, and it awarded Deborah a net property award of $352,630 plus an
additional $117,000 in future cash payments to equalize the property
division. 447 The court also found that the divorce disadvantaged Deborah
and awarded her $500 in permanent spousal support, increasing to $1000
per month after the youngest child no longer qualified for child support.448




439. Id. 1 3.
440. Id.
441. Id. 4, 629 N.W.2d at 577-78.
442. Id. at 578.
443. Id.
444. Id. 6. During the trial, the parties significantly disagreed about the value of the part-
nership, including warehouse leases and equipment value. Id. 9 5. Each side had an expert testify
at trial. Id. Carl's expert testified that the partnership had a negative value while Deborah's
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Carl appealed the judgment, and the North Dakota Supreme Court
turned to the controlling laws, North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)
and North Dakota Century Code section 14-05-24.450 According to North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a), an appellate court should not over-
rule a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings were clearly errone-
ous. 451 North Dakota Century Code section 14-05-24 controls a trial court's
division of marital property and its application of support obligations.4 52
The code requires the trial court to make an "equitable distribution" of
marital property and to provide for "suitable allowances" of support based
upon the circumstances of the parties.453 Carl argued that the trial court's
valuation and distribution of the parties' property, the spousal support
award, and the child support award were clearly erroneous. 454
The court first examined the distribution of property relating to the
valuation of the partnership, economic misconduct, and the future cash pay-
ments. 455 Carl argued that the trial court incorrectly determined the partner-
ship value at $1,049,295.456 He claimed that Deborah's expert should not
have based the partnership value on the fair market value of an ongoing
business, but should have used the liquidation value of the business because
of its stressed financial condition.457
The law views a trial court's valuation of property as a presumptively
correct finding of fact that is subject to the clearly erroneous standard.4 58
450. Id. I 7-8; see also N.D. R. Civ. P. 52(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (Supp. 2001).
451. Hoverson v. Hoverson, 2001 ND 124, 7, 629 N.W.2d 573, 578 (citing N.D. R. CIv. P.
52(a)).
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law,
if there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it,
on the entire evidence the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a
mistake has been made.
Mellum v. Mellum, 2000 ND 47, 9, 607 N.W.2d 580, 583 (citing Fox v. Fox, 1999 ND 68, 7,
592 N.W.2d 541, 545).
452. Hoverson, 8, 629 N.W.2d at 578 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24). The North
Dakota Century Code states:
Division of property.
1. When a divorce is granted, the court shall make an equitable distribution of the
property and debts of the parties.
2. The court may redistribute property in a postjudgment proceeding if a party has
failed to disclose property and debts as required by rules adopted by the supreme
court or the party fails to comply with the terms of a court order distributing
property and debts).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24.
453. Hoverson, 8, 629 N.W.2d at 578.
454. Id. 9.
455. Id. ' 10-29, 629 N.W.2d at 579-83.
456. Id. 10, 629 N.W.2d at 579.
457. Id. 911.
458. Id. 9 13 (citing Peterson v. Peterson, 1999 ND 191, [ 12, 600 N.W.2d 851, 855).
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Marital property valuations that fall within the range of evidence are not
clearly erroneous.459 The court found that the trial court's judgment fell
within the range of evidence. 460 Both parties had experts testify as to the
partnership's value, and the trial court had mostly adopted the testimony of
Deborah's expert.46' Consequently, the court found the trial court's
valuation was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the partnership
valuation.
462
Carl also argued that the trial court erred in dividing the marital proper-
ty based upon a finding of economic fault on his part.463 The trial court
found that Carl had committed economic misconduct when he transferred
the parties' stocks and real estate to the partnership without Deborah's con-
sent.46 4 The elements of economic misconduct require that the misconduct
result in a "wasted asset or in the reduction of the net marital estate."
465
Examining the record, the court could not find any evidence that Carl's
transfer of the stocks and real estate had resulted in wasted assets or the
reduction of the net marital estate. 466 As a result, the court reversed the trial
court's finding of Carl's economic misconduct.
467
Regarding the future cash payments of $117,000, Carl claimed that the
trial court's decision to award these payments to Deborah was also clearly
erroneous. 468 In Emter v. Emter,46 9 the court stated that it would remand for
clarification a trial court's property distributions if the court could not "dis-
cern the rationale for the trial court's decision through inference or deduc-
tion."470 At initial glance, the record appeared to show that the trial court
intended the future cash payments to make up the difference between the
value of the property allocated between the parties. 47' However, in closely
analyzing the facts, the court found that the trial court's calculations had
possibly given Deborah a double recovery in regards to the partnership
459. Id. (citing Peterson, 12, 600 N.W.2d at 855).
460. Id. 9 15, 629 N.W.2d at 580.
461. See id. 14, 629 N.W.3d at 579 (noting that the trial court had considered the testimony
of both parties' experts and had primarily adopted the valuations of Deborah's expert).
462. Id. 9115, 629 N.W.2d at 580.
463. Id. 9116.
464. Id. The court has held that economic and noneconomic fault are factors a trial court
may consider in dividing marital property. Reiser v. Reiser, 2001 ND 6, 12, 621 N.W.2d 348,
351.
465. Hoverson v. Hoverson, 2001 ND 124, 24, 629 N.W.2d 573, 581.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. 1 25, 629 N.W.2d at 582.
469. 1999 ND 102, 595 N.W.2d 16.
470. Hoverson, 27, 629 N.W.2d at 582 (citing Emter, 1 8, 595 N.W.2d at 19-20).
471. Id. 28.
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assets.472 Because the basis for the trial court's figures eluded the court, it
remanded the distribution of property back to the trial court for further
clarification or recomputation. 473
Next, the court addressed the trial court's award of permanent spousal
support.474 In analyzing spousal support, the court applied the Ruff-Fisher
guidelines, which require a court to find that the divorce will disadvantage
the requesting spouse prior to awarding support.4 75 "A disadvantaged
spouse is one who has forgone opportunities or lost advantages as a
consequence of the marriage and who has contributed during the marriage
to the supporting spouse's increased earning capacity." 476 In Weigel v.
Weigel,477 the court found that a homemaker out of the workforce had for-
gone opportunities and lost the advantage of work experience. 478 In this
case, the court found that Deborah had devoted herself to the farm and
family and that she would not likely rehabilitate her earning capacity to any
great degree.4 79 Therefore, the court considered Deborah a disadvantaged
spouse and found that the trial court did not err in awarding her permanent
spousal support.4 80
Finally, the court considered Carl's contention that the trial court erred
in awarding Deborah $1005 per month in child support.48 1 A court
calculates child support obligations by using the North Dakota Department
of Human Services guidelines.4 82 The guidelines require a court to first
calculate an obligor's gross income less the obligor's tax liabilities.4 83 A
court does not use the obligor's actual tax liabilities but instead must use a
hypothetical federal income tax obligation based on the obligor's standard
deductions and the corresponding tax tables.a84 Because the trial court
472. Id. The court conducted its own property award calculations to equalize the property
distribution, which did not match the trial court's calculations. Id.
473. Id. 29, 629 N.W.2d at 583.
474. Id. 9 30.
475. Id. T 31 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 2000 ND 170, 49, 617 N.W.2d 97, 111).
476. Id. (quoting Johnson, [ 49, 617 N.W.2d at 111).
477. 2000 ND 16, 604 N.W.2d 462.
478. Weigel, 13, 604 N.W.2d at 466.
479. Hoverson v. Hoverson, 2001 ND 124, 32, 629 N.W.2d 573, 583.
480. Id. 33.
481. Id. 1 34.
482. Id. 9 35, 629 N.W.2d at 583-84.
483. Id. at 584.
484. Id. Net income used to determine the tax liability is defined as gross annual income
less:
a. A hypothetical federal income tax obligation based on the obligor's gross
income, reduced by the part of the obligor's gross income that is not subject to
income tax liability under the Internal Revenue code, and applying: The standard
deduction for the tax filing status of single;
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incorrectly used Carl's actual tax liabilities to calculate child support in-
stead of the standard deductions, the North Dakota Supreme Court remand-
ed the issue to the trial court to recalculate Carl's child support obligation
using the proper tax liability. 485
FAMILY LAW- DIVORCE- PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
KOPP V. KOPP
In Kopp v. Kopp,486 Myron Kopp appealed from the district court's
amended judgment. 87 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
amended judgment 488 and concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting relief from the original divorce judgment under
North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(vi).489
Myron and Ardella Kopp were divorced on December 15, 1999.490
Under the original divorce judgment, Ardella received approximately $7500
in net equity while Myron received about equal amounts of property and
debt.491 No spousal support was awarded, but Myron was ordered to pay
$526 per month in child support.492 Each party was required to indemnify
and hold harmless the other party in the event either of them failed to pay
their assigned debts.493 Neither party appealed the original judgment.494
(1) One exemption for the obligor;
(2) One additional exemption for each child actually claimed on a disclosed
income tax return or one additional exemption for each child, as defined in
this section, if a tax return is not disclosed; and
(3) Tax tables for a single individual for the most recent year published by the
internal revenue service, reduced by one child tax credit for each child's
exemption considered under paragraph 3.
b. A hypothetical state income tax obligation equal to fourteen percent of the
amount determined under subdivision a without reduction for child tax credits.
Id. (quoting N.D. ADMtN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-01(7)).
485. Id. 9 38.
486. 2001 ND 41,622 N.W.2d 726.
487. Kopp, 1,622 N.W.2d at 727.
488. Id. 1 12, 622 N.W.2d at 730.
489. Id.; The North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Mistakes-Inadvertence-Excusable neglect-Newly discovered evidence-Fraud-Etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment or order in any action or proceeding for the
following reasons: ... (vi) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion must be made with in a reasonable time ....
N.D. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(vi).
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Shortly after the deadline for appealing the judgment had passed,
Myron filed for bankruptcy.9 5 Ardella then moved for relief from the di-
vorce judgment under North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b).496 The
trial court found that Myron's bankruptcy had created a "terrific disparity"
in the financial situations of the parties by essentially releasing Myron from
the marital debt he was ordered to pay. 497 As a result, the district court
vacated the original divorce judgment under Rule 60(b)(vi) and entered an
amended judgment.4 98
The supreme court determined that the district court did not have the
ability to modify spousal support and property distribution based upon
continuing jurisdiction in the matter under North Dakota Century Code sec-
tion 14-05-24.499 However, the motion for relief was brought under North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), which authorizes a court to grant
relief from a final judgment. 500 The court stated that a divorce judgment
may be attacked in the same manner as any other final judgment; thus, the
Rule 60(b) motion was proper.501
A trial court's decision to grant a Rule 60(b)(vi) is left alone unless
there was an abuse of discretion. 502 The district court determined, and the
supreme court agreed, that the motion was brought within a reasonable
time503 and that extraordinary circumstances existed.504 The court noted
that the intent of Rule 60(b)(vi) was to allow an opportunity for relief where
hardship or injustice may occur and that the rule should be liberally
construed and applied.505 In this case, there were sufficient extraordinary
495. Id.
496. Id. at 727-28.
497. Id. at 728.
498. Id.
499. Id. 91 5. The North Dakota Century Code states:
Division of Property.
1. When a divorce is granted, the court shall make an equitable distribution of the
property and debts of the parties.
2. The court may redistribute property in a post-judgment proceeding if a party has
failed to disclose property and debts as required by rules adopted by the supreme
court or the party fails to comply with the terms of a court order distributing
property and debts.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (Supp. 2001).
500. Kopp v. Kopp, 2001 ND 41, 6, 622 N.W.2d 726, 728.
501. Id.
502. Id. 91 7.
503. The motion was brought about three months after entry of the original judgment and
within weeks after Myron filed for bankruptcy. Id. 91 8, 622 N.W.2d at 729. A motion brought
within a year of the entry of judgment is generally considered to be brought within a "reasonable
time." Id. 1 5,622 N.W.2d at 728.
504. Id. T 12, 622 N.W.2d at 730.
505. Id. T 10, 622 N.W.2d at 729.
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circumstances that allowed the district court to grant relief from the original
judgment under Rule 60(b)(vi) and enter an amended judgment.
506
FAMILY LAW-TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
IN RE T.K.
M.F. (Mary) appealed the juvenile court's decision to terminate her
parental rights to her two children, T.K. (Tim) and D.F. (David).507 The
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the termination, finding that clear
and convincing evidence existed to show that Mary had deprived the
children, that the deprivation was likely to continue, and that the children
would probably suffer serious physical, mental, and emotional harm if her
parental rights were not terminated. 508
The facts portrayed the children's lives as lives of emotional and
physical abuse in an inadequate home environment.509 Mary had an
ongoing, violent, and chaotic relationship involving physical abuse with the
children's father, M.K. (Mike).510 However, Mike and Mary were not mar-
ried.51' When Tim was ten months old, a doctor diagnosed his develop-
mental delay and established that the delay was substantially due to lack of
caregiver stimulation and insufficient nurturing.512 The evidence also
showed that Mary had attempted to ram Tim's stroller into Mike with Tim
in the stroller and that Mike had fed Tim a small amount of alcohol and
blew marijuana smoke in his face. 513 Due to the continual abuse, the juve-
nile court determined Tim was a deprived child and placed him in foster
care in 1998; he has remained there ever since.514
Even after the state put Early Headstart and Parent Aide programs in
place to assist Mary,515 she continued to put her abusive relationship with
Mike ahead of the needs of Tim. 516 Mary and Mike sought and obtained
several protection orders against each other, and Mary received a six-month
prison sentence in January 1999 for violating one of the orders.517 Mike
506. Id. f 12, 622 N.W.2d at 730.
507. In re T.K., 2001 ND 127, 1,630 N.W.2d 38, 40.
508. Id.
509. Id. 1 3-11, 630 N.W.2d at 40-43.
510. Id. 1 3,630 N.W.2d at 40-41.
511. Id.
512. Id. 4, 630 N.W.2d at 41. Subsequent examinations determined that Tim was a special
needs child with a brain abnormality and possible retardation. Id.
513. Id. 9 5.
514. Id. 99 5, 6, 8-9, 630 N.W.2d at 41-42.
515. Id. 6, 630 N.W.2d at 41.
516. Id. 9, 630 N.W.2d at 42.
517. Id. 9 7.
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also was convicted of burglary, forgery, and theft.518 Despite these con-
tinual problems, Mary again became pregnant with Mike's child in 1999.519
On March 18, 2000, Mary gave birth to David.520 The state removed
David from Mary's home a few months after his birth when Mike reported
that Mary had "plopped" the child roughly onto the couch and, on several
occasions, had threatened to throw David against the wall. 52' On Septem-
ber 8, 2000, the juvenile court concluded that David was a deprived child
and placed him in the custody of Ramsey County Social Services.522
North Dakota law allows a juvenile court to terminate parental rights if
the following three elements are satisfied by clear and convincing evidence:
(1) the child is a deprived child; (2) the conditions and causes of the depri-
vation are likely to continue; and (3) the child is suffering, or will in the fu-
ture suffer, serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. 523 The
North Dakota Supreme Court recognized that although parental rights are of
constitutional dimension, theses rights are not absolute, and parents must
comply with the minimum community standards. 524 The court then applied
the three elements to Mary's particular circumstances. 525
First, the court found the record clearly supported a finding that Tim
and David were deprived. 526 Tim's inability to thrive, the abusive parental
relationship, and each parent's belief that the other one was an inadequate
518. Id.
519. Id. 9 9.
520. Id. 9110, 630 N.W.2d at 43.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. The North Dakota Century Code states:
1. The court by order may terminate the parental rights of a parent with respect to
the parent's child if:
b. The child is a deprived child and the court finds:
(1) The conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or
will not be remedied and that by reason thereof the child is suffering
or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional
harm;
N.D. CENT. CODE. § 27-20-44 (1)(b)(l) (Supp. 2001); see also In re T.K., 2001 ND 127, 2, 630
N.W.2d 38, 40.
524. In re T.K., 12, 630 N.W.2d at 43 (citing In re D.N., 2001 ND 71, 12, 624 N.W.2d
686, 689).
525. Id. 9 12-17, 630 N.W.2d at 43-45. The court reviews the termination of parental
rights in a manner similar to a trial de novo. See id. 9f 2, 630 N.W.2d at 40.
526. Id. 13, 630 N.W.2d at 43. A "deprived child" means a child who
[is without proper parental care or control, subsistence, education as required by law,
or other care or control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health,
or morals, and the deprivation is not due primarily to the lack of financial means of the
child's parents, guardian, or other custodian.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(8)(a) (Supp. 2001).
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parent contributed to the court's decision. 527 The examples of the stroller
incident and the marijuana smoke in the infant's face solidified, in the jus-
tices' minds, that Mary and Mike had failed to meet the minimum parental
standards for providing a proper home environment.528
Second, the court disagreed with Mary and found that there was clear
and convincing evidence that the children's deprivation would likely con-
tinue.529 The court stated that evidence of past deprivation by itself is not
enough to meet this element, but that there must be "prognostic evidence
that forms the basis for reasonable prediction of continued or future depri-
vation." 530 The court focused on Mary's sporadic participation and limited
commitment to numerous assistance programs, two psychological evalua-
tions, and the escalating cycle of domestic violence surrounding Mary and
Mike's relationship in reaching its decision.531 The psychologist found that
Mary's chances of making the necessary changes to correct her parenting
style were quite limited. 532 Even after the state had given Mary more time
to improve, the record clearly showed that no significant advancements had
occurred in her parental skills.533
Finally, the court rejected Mary's claim that there was not sufficient
evidence to conclude that the children were suffering or would suffer
physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm as a result of the deprivation. 534
The court reiterated that it is not enough for a mother to indicate a desire to
improve,535 and the court need not wait until a tragic event occurs before
terminating parental rights. 536 Mary, according to the evidence, could not
sufficiently control her emotions to provide a safe home environment. 537
Also, her failure to take advantage of the programs provided to her
indicated a lack of desire to improve. 538 As a result, the court found by
clear and convincing evidence that the children were suffering and would
527. In re T.K., [ 13, 630 N.W.2d at 43-44.
528. Id. at 44.
529. Id. [ 16, 630 N.W.2d at 45.
530. Id. 114, 630 N.W.2d at 44 (citing In re Z.R., 1999 ND 214, 18, 602 N.W.2d 723,
727).
531. Id. 15-16, 630 N.W.2d at 44-45.
532. Id. 91 16. After conducting two psychological evaluations of Mary, Dr. Faramarz
Simhai, a clinical and counseling psychologist at the Lake Region Human Service Center, deter-
mined that the chances of Mary improving her parental style were very limited, but he did suggest
giving Mary several more months to try to change. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. 17, 630 N.W.2d at 45.
535. Id. (citing McBeth v. M.D.K., 447 N.W.2d 318, 322 (N.D. 1989)).
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likely suffer serious physical, mental, or emotional harm if Mary continued
as their caregiver.539 Therefore, the termination of Mary's parental rights
was affirmed. 540
HEALTH CARE LAW - INSURANCE- MEDICAID
SCHMIDT V. WARD COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES
Bo, a minor child, lived with his mother after she divorced his father,
Dennis Schmidt.541 When Bo's mother died, he began living with his
father.5 42 A conservatorship, which was funded from a $25,000 life insur-
ance policy belonging to his mother, was established for Bo. 543 Schmidt
was appointed the conservator. 54 The conservatorship fund's disbursement
schedule directed the funds to be paid either in increments after Bo
graduated from high school or completely when he reached the age of
twenty-three.545 Bo and his father started receiving both Medicaid benefits
and food stamps when the conservatorship was established. 546 The
Medicaid benefits were based upon Bo's qualification as a dependent child
who was deprived due to his mother's death.5 47 Schmidt received benefits
because he was included in the Medicaid unit.548
Upon recertification, the county in which the household resided termi-
nated the household's eligibility for both Medicaid and food stamp benefits
because the inclusion of the conservatorship funds in the household's assets
exceeded the eligibility requirements for the programs. 549  Schmidt
appealed this decision to the Department of Human Services. 550 After a
hearing, the county's decision to terminate the benefits was affirmed by an
administrative law judge.551 The district court affirmed the Department's
decisions. 552
In determining Medicaid eligibility, all assets are considered, including
"property held in a trust ... to the extent the property is actually available
539. Id.
540. Id. 9 18.
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to a Medicaid applicant or recipient." 553 "The rules for trusts apply regard-
less of the purpose for which the trust [was] established and whether there
are any restrictions on the use of distributions from the trust." 554 North
Dakota law recognizes that a conservatorship bears many similarities to a
trust.555 A conservator is given the title of "trustee" over the minor's prop-
erty. 556 The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Department of
Human Services' decision that a conservatorship is a legal device comp-
arable to a trust within the context of the law for determining Medicaid
eligibility.557
The father, as the conservator, could petition the appointing court to
amend the conservatorship and direct a distribution of the conservatorship
funds at any time.558 The court held that just because the conservator had to
initiate legal proceedings to access the funds did not make the funds
unavailable. 559 Furthermore, the requirement to petition the court to distri-
bute funds from the conservatorship did not constitute a substantial legal or
practical impediment. 560 Therefore, the conservatorship funds were availa-
ble individually to the minor in order to determine his Medicaid eligi-
bility.561 Because the funds exceeded the $6000 asset limit allowed for a
two-person Medicaid unit and the $2000 asset limit for a household as
required by the food stamp program, eligibility was denied for both Bo and
his father.562 Social policy reflects the concept that recipients of public
money must use their own available income and resources before shifting
the burden for their support to the public. 563 The court also stated that the
father had no independent basis for Medicaid eligibility, as his eligibility
553. Id. ( 10, 634 N.W.2d at 510.
554. Id. 10.
555. Id. 1 11; N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 30.1-29 (1996 & Supp. 2001). This section establishes
conservatorships for the protection and management of a minor's property. N.D. CENT. CODE ch.
30.1-29. A conservator also has the powers of a trustee. Id. § 30.1-29-24(1). A conservator has a
fiduciary relationship to the minor, similar to the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary.
See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward § 2 (1999).
556. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-20 (1996).
557. Schmidt v. Ward County Soc. Servs. Bd., 2001 ND 169, 7, 11, 634 N.W.2d 506,
509, 510.
558. Id. 9116, 634 N.W.2d at 512.
559. Id. ( 14, 634 N.W.2d at 511; see also Post v. Cass County Soc. Servs. Bd., 556 N.W.2d
661, 665-66 (N.D. 1996) (upholding an administrative determination that overdue property settle-
ment payments were actually available as the party was legally entitled to such payments under
the divorce decree).
560. Schmidt, 12, 14, 634 N.W.2d at 511.
561. Id. 16, 634 N.W.2d at 512.
562. Id. SJ 16-17.
563. Id. 9 15, 634 N.W.2d at 511; see also In re McMullen, 470 N.W.2d 196, 201 (N.D.
1991) (stating that the court's decision on the necessity of releasing a minor's funds is to be based
solely upon need, and not upon the availability of such benefits, as a matter of social policy).
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arose solely from living with his minor dependent child who was deprived
due to his mother's death.564 The Department's decision to deny Medicaid
benefits was affirmed.
565
The food stamp program is a federal program. 566 In determining food
stamp eligibility, any resources and property not excluded under the federal
statute are used to calculate a household's resources. 567 An irrevocable
trust is one such exclusion.568 Because a conservatorship is a legal device
similar to a revocable trust and is not specifically excluded under the federal
regulation, it is counted towards a household's resources. 569 Because the
inclusion of the conservatorship funds exceeded the $2000 ceiling used to
determine food stamp eligibility, the Department's decision to deny food
stamps was also affirmed.570
LABOR LAW- NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
WARNER & CO. V. SOLBERG
Warner Insurance employed Shirley Solberg from 1980 to 1997 when
she voluntarily left to become employed at Vaaler Insurance. 571 After Sol-
berg resigned, she sold her stock in Warner but retained files that contained
policyholder and personnel information. 572 In 1992, Solberg signed a pro-
ducer agreement with Warner covering "limitations after termination of
employment on efforts to discontinue existing policies, [write] replacement
policies," solicit former employees, and misappropriate trade secrets.
573
564. Schmidt, 16, 634 N.W.2d at 512.
565. Id.
566. Id. 1 18; 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1999).
567. Schmidt, [9 18, 19,634 N.W.2d at 512-13; 7 C.F.R. § 273.8(e) (2001).
568. Schmidt, 19, 634 N.W.2d at 513; 7 C.F.R. § 273.8(e)(8)(i).
569. Schmidt, 20, 634 N.W.2d at 513.
570. Id.
571. Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 2001 ND 156, 2-4, 634 N.W.2d 65, 68.
572. Id. 99 4, 5.
573. Id. 1 3, 11, 634 N.W.2d 65, 68-69. Paragraph 6 of the agreement stated:
6. During the Producer's employment and for a period of three (3) years following
the date of termination of the Producer's employment with the Agency, the
Producer will not engage directly or indirectly, personally or through any other
person in any of the following prohibited activities:
a. The Producer will not solicit, contact or in any way attempt to affect the
discontinuance of any of the Agency's insurance business.
b. The Producer will not on the Producer's own behalf or for any other
agency, broker, salesman, or insurance company accept or write any policy
of insurance in replacement of any policy issued by the Agency prior to the
termination of this agreement, or otherwise be involved in or assist with the
replacement of any such insurance business.
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Warner lost the business of several clients previously serviced by Solberg
within a few months of her resignation. 574 These clients were then serviced
by Solberg at Vaaler Insurance.57 5 Eight months after Solberg resigned, an
employee of Warner who had been assigned to Solberg left Warner, joined
Vaaler, and was assigned to Solberg.576
Warner sued Solberg alleging breach of contract by Solberg's
effectuating the transfer of clients previously with Warner, soliciting an em-
ployee of Warner to leave her job for a new position at Vaaler, and retain-
ing files and trade secrets belonging to Warner. 577 Warner's breach of
contract claim against Solberg was dismissed in summary judgment.578 The
trial court held there were no questions of material fact, and the contract
was an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of North Dakota Century
Code section 9-08-06.579
Warner argued the agreement was valid and not within the purview of
section 9-08-06.580 Although section 9-08-06, which prohibits the restraint
of free trade, appears to offer protection to the party against whom such a
complaint is directed, such a statute is based upon a public policy
doctrine. 581 "[T]he right of the public's access to the services offered by the
employee" is given preference over the employee's interests.582 The court
acknowledged that section 9-08-06 negates clauses in employment
agreements that are absolute bars to employees from competing with
previous employers or working for competitors. 583 However, the Eighth
c. The Producer will not solicit or seek to influence any other employee of the
Agency to become directly or indirectly the employee or representative of
any other insurance agency or insurance company.
Id. 11, 634 N.W.2d at 69.
574. Id. 6, 634 N.W.2d at 68.
575. Id.
576. Id. 91 7.
577. Id. 91 8.
578. Id. 91 9.
579. Id. 19 9, 12-13, 634 N.W.2d at 68-69; N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1987).
Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void, except:
I. One who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain
from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, city, or a part of
either, so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him
carries on a like business therein.
2. Partners, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution ...
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06.
580. Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 2001 ND 156, 11, 634 N.W.2d 65, 69.
581. ld. 91 13.
582. Id. 9[ 14, 634 N.W.2d at 70.
583. Id. (R 17.
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Circuit Court of Appeals had applied North Dakota law and concluded that
less burdensome restrictions may survive. 584
The plain language of North Dakota Century Code section 9-08-06 and
the history of legislation in North Dakota regarding this issue prevented the
court from upholding the less burdensome restrictions. 585 Parts 6(a) and (b)
of the agreement were not included as exceptions to the code section listed
above, and the court first looked to the language in the statute to determine
the intended meaning by the lawmakers.586 The North Dakota Legislature
has entertained legislation seeking to recognize the validity of provisions
restricting the ability of a former employee to solicit a former employer's
clients, but has declined to do so numerous times, including the most recent
Fifty-Seventh Legislative Session. 587 Such provisions would restrain third
parties from contracting with a business or professional of their choice.5 88
The court stated the issue in this case did not escape the broad prohibition
in section 9-08-06 that declares contracts constituting a restraint of business
void.589
Warner also argued that the goodwill exception to section 9-08-06
applied. 590 The court reasoned that Solberg's sale of a 1/200 interest in
stock of Warner could not be said to transfer the goodwill of the business;
therefore, the trial court was correct in concluding that the goodwill
exception to North Dakota Century Code section 9-08-06 did not apply. 591
The court held that the narrowly drawn clause in part 6(c) of the agree-
ment to penalize Solberg for soliciting an employee was not void as a re-
straint of trade, but that fact questions still remained as to whether Solberg
had violated the clause.592 The trial court made no specific findings con-
cerning Warner's claim that Solberg misappropriated trade secrets. 593 Fact
questions and questions of law still remained concerning whether the files
were indeed trade secrets and whether Solberg's actions constituted
misappropriation of trade secrets. 594
584. Id.; see also Kovarik v. Am. Family Ins. Group, 108 F.3d 962, 965 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an agreement to limit solicitation of current policyholders for one year could be
upheld).
585. Warner, 118, 634 N.W.2d at 71.
586. Id. 9 19.
587. Id. 9[ 20.
588. Id. 1 24, 634 N.W.2d at 73.
589. Id.
590. Id. T 26.
591. Id. T 29,634 N.W.2d at 74.
592. Id. 9 25, 634 N.W.2d at 73.
593. Id. [ 36, 634 N.W.2d at 76.
594. Id.
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The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the portion of the agree-
ment covering limitations on efforts to discontinue existing policies and
writing replacement policies after termination of employment was void, as
it unlawfully restrained trade under North Dakota Century Code section
9-08-06.595 The court reversed and remanded the claims regarding the
clauses prohibiting Solberg from soliciting Warner's employee and
misappropriating trade secrets. 596
PROPERTY LAW-FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
FARSTVEET v. RUDOLPH EX REL. EILEEN RUDOLPH ESTATE
In March 1994, the Farstveets purchased dairy cows from Eileen
Rudolph.597 The Farstveets were unsatisfied with the sale and brought suit
against Rudolph for breach of contract, fraud, and breach of warranty for
the sale of the cows. 598 On April 30, 1998, a $79,700 judgment was entered
in favor of the Farstveets. 599 On March 23, 1998, Rudolf signed over to her
son, Ray, and his wife, Della, a promissory note and mortgage on the
subject property in the amount of $133,449 in exchange for bills that they
had paid on her behalf.600 In return, Ray and Della assumed the mortgage
on the property.60 The trial court determined that even though a large por-
tion of the debt was for equipment loan payments made by Ray and Della,
there was a prior contract between Rudolph and Ray that extinguished
Rudolph from owing Ray for those loan payments.602 A portion of the
property that was transferred by Rudolph to Della was her homestead.6 3 In
October 1996, Rudolph had some health problems and was admitted to a
senior care facility in Valley City.604 Shortly after she was admitted, her
grandson and his family moved into her home. 605 They did not pay
Rudolph any rent, but they did pay the utility bills and kept up the
595. Id. 24, 37, 634 N.W.2d at 73, 76.
596. Id. 919 25, 36-37.
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property.606 Rudolph's property was later removed from the home and sold
to pay her medical expenses. 607
The trial court determined that Rudolph did not receive an equal value
for the property that was transferred to Della, and that she was insolvent at
the time of the transfer.608 The court also determined that Ray and Della
were insiders and that the consideration given was an antecedent debt.609
The trial court concluded that Rudolph abandoned her homestead and made
a fraudulent transfer of property to Della.610 Rudolph appealed on February
15, 2000.611 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court originally deter-
mined that Rudolph had abandoned her homestead.612 The determination
was based on the fact that there was a sale of her property. 613 In its holding,
the court relied heavily on bankruptcy cases and stated, "there is no more
convincing proof that abandonment has occurred than the sale of the
homestead." 614
However, on rehearing the court was persuaded that the cases it relied
on in its previous decision were distinguishable from the current case
because those cases were in the context of bankruptcy proceedings. 615 The
court stated that this case was distinguishable because Rudolph transferred
her homestead to Della on March 23, 1998, before judgment was entered
against Rudolph.616 The court stated, "A creditor cannot set aside as fraud-
ulent a transfer of the property that the debtor could have claimed as
exempt."617 Thus, because Rudolph could have claimed her homestead as
an exemption while she possessed title to it, the Farstveets could not
enforce a claim against the homestead after Della acquired title to it.618 The
court stated that in order for the transfer to be challenged as fraudulent
under these circumstances, abandonment had to be established based upon
facts independent of the transfer.619
The court then discussed whether there was evidence, other than the
transfer, that supported the trial court's finding that Rudolph abandoned her
606. Id.
607. Id.
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home.620 The trial court determined that Rudolph had abandoned the home
because her grandson moved into the house with his family after she was
taken to the senior care facility. 621 In some cases, leasing can be considered
abandonment; however, it is not conclusive evidence of abandonment. 622
The trial court also considered the fact that Rudolph's property was
transported out of the home and sold by her family members.623 The
supreme court stated that, under the circumstances, Rudolph's grandson
moving into her home did not conclusively establish abandonment.6 24 The
court reasoned that the evidence in the record indicated that Rudolph left
her home involuntarily after she began to have difficulty with the prostheses
in her knee. 625 Also, the removal and sale of Rudolph's assets from the
home did not by itself constitute abandonment. 626 In Meidinger v. Security
State Bank of Medina627 and Larson v. Cole,628 the court stated a sale of
household goods was insufficient evidence to establish abandonment even
when it was considered with other circumstances. 629 In this case, the trial
court specifically found that Rudolph's property was sold to pay her
medical bills.630
Once the court found that Rudolph did not abandon her homestead, it
discussed whether the non-exempt property qualified as an asset within the
meaning of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.631 The court made it
clear that if the non-exempt property was an asset within the meaning of the
Act, the transfer of such property would be considered fraudulent under
North Dakota Century Code section 13-02.1-05(2).632 However, if the
620. Id. 91 30.
621. Id. 9f 33, 630 N.W.2d at 33.
622. Id. 91 32.
623. Id. 1 35.
624. Id. T 34.
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. 213 N.W. 850 (N.D. 1927).
628. 33 N.W.2d 325 (N.D. 1948).
629. Farstveet v. Rudolph ex rel. Eileen Rudolph Estate, 2000 ND 189, 35, 630 N.W.2d
24, 33. The court in Meidinger held that a debtor's removal from his homestead because of a
health condition that left him unable to care for himself did not constitute abandonment.
Meidinger v. Security State Bank of Medina, 213 N.W. 850, 851 (N.D. 1927).
630. Farstveet, 35, 630 N.W. 2d at 33.
631. Id. North Dakota Century Code section 13-02.1-01(2) states:
"Asset" means property of a debtor, excluding property to the extent it is encumbered
by a valid lien, property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law,
or an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject
to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-01(2) (1997).
632. Farstveet, 38, 630 N.W. 2d at 34. North Dakota Century Code section 13-02.1-05
states:
2002]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
property was not an asset within the meaning of the Act, the property would
not be subject to a fraudulent transfer under North Dakota Century Code
section 13-02.1-05(2).633
Rudolph argued that the non-exempt property was encumbered by
valid liens that exceeded the value of the property.634 The trial court did not
determine the value of the property, and thus, the court was unable to deter-
mine whether there was equity left after subtracting the mortgage and
judgment lien. 635 If there was equity remaining in the property after such a
,subtraction, it would be subject to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and
available to the Farstveets to satisfy their judgment. 636 If there was no equi-
ty left after subtraction to satisfy the mortgage, the mortgagor could resort
to the homestead property. 637
PROPERTY LAW- QUIETING TITLE- ADVERSE CLAIMS
JAMES V. GRIFFIN
George and Juanita James (James) purchased two lots in the city of
Wahpeton in 1945.638 In September 1979, James deeded the property to the
city because the house standing on the property was to be condemned. 639
The property was returned to James in November 1979 after a new house
was placed upon it.640
In 1995, the Griffins purchased the adjoining lots and discovered that
James's brick fireplace, a gravel drive, and the old garage foundation were
actually located on the property they purchased. 641 In 1998, the Griffins
constructed a fence on the actual property line in an attempt to keep James
from claiming the property. 642
James then sued to quiet title in 1999, claiming that they had estab-
lished ownership of the property through the doctrine of acquiescence. 643
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose
before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antece-
dent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-02.1-05(2) (1997).
633. Farstveet, 40, 630 N.W. 2d at 34.
634. Id. 9 41.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 35 n.3.





643. Id. [ 5.
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They claimed that the previous owners of the Griffins' property had acqui-
esced in the property line for twenty years prior to May 1998, when the
fence had been constructed. 644
In a pretrial conference, the trial court informed James that they needed
to show that the city acquiesced in the boundary line during its period of
ownership because without such acquiescence, the chain of title was broken
and the twenty-year requirement had not been met.645 The court dismissed
the case for lack of evidence from James, and James appealed.646
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the doctrine of acqui-
escence required that the parties were mistaken as to the true boundary line
and that the adjoining landowners agreed to the location of the boundary for
at least twenty years. 647 Acquiescence may be found through silence, but
the burden of proving acquiescence lies with the party claiming against the
true owner.648
The principle of tacking applies to the doctrine of acquiescence just as
it does in the doctrine of adverse possession.649 However, the possession of
the property for the twenty years must have been both continuous and
adverse to the true owner.650 The period in question is measured back from
the commencement of the action.651 In this case, the court found that when
the city of Wahpeton held the property its interest was not adverse to the
true owner, and therefore, the period when the city was the title owner of
the property could not be used to satisfy the twenty-year requirement.652
The court found that the period of James's adverse possession of the
property began to run when they re-acquired the property from the city in
1979, which was less than twenty years prior to the building of the fence.653
Therefore, the Griffins retained title to the property.654
Justice Neumann dissented, stating that the twenty-year requirement
had been met in this situation prior to the period when the city took
possession of the property. 655 Justice Neumann argued that the twenty-year
requirement did not need to be the twenty years immediately prior to the
644. Id.
645. Id. 1 6.
646. Id. 9 7-8, 626 N.W.2d at 706-07.
647. Id. 1 10, 626 N.W.2d at 707-08.
648. Id. at 708.
649. Id. 9[ 11.
650. Id.
651. Id. 12.
652. Id. 15, 626 N.W.2d at 709.
653. Id.
654. Id.
655. Id. I 19 (Neumann, J., dissenting).
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commencement of the action, but it could be satisfied by any twenty-year
period where the property was held adversely against the true owners.656
TORTS-COMPARATIVE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
SOLLIN V. WANGLER
Richard Sollin was employed by David Migler to operate a bale
grinder.657 In February 1995, Migler sent Sollin to the Wangler farm to
grind straw. 658 While David Wangler was attempting to load an additional
bale into the grinder, it fell out of the tub and injured Sollin, who was
attempting to grease the running machine in preparation for the next job.659
In January 1999, Sollin filed a suit against the Wanglers for negligence. 60
The Wanglers argued that Sollin's own negligence caused the accident. 661
At the jury trial, Sollin did not request a jury instruction explaining
how a finding of comparative fault would affect a damage award.662 Under
North Dakota law, if Sollin's negligence was found to be equal to or greater
than the negligence of any of the other persons involved, he could not
recover.663 The jury instruction proposed by Sollin ordered that if both par-
ties were found to be at fault, "you will ... return a Special Verdict deter-
mining the amount of those damages, without diminution for negligence
and determining the percentages of fault of each party which proximately
caused the damages claimed." 664
During deliberations, the jury indicated that it considered both parties
at fault and asked if the percentage of fault would affect damage awards. 665
The court and parties agreed to handle this question off the record. 666 The
jury determined that Sollin had suffered $100,000 in damages, but found
Sollin and Wangler each fifty percent at fault. 667 Therefore, the trial court
dismissed the claims with prejudice. 668 Sollin then unsuccessfully moved
for a new trial, stating that the court had violated his fundamental
656. Id. at 709-10.
657. Sollin v. Wangler, 2001 ND 96, [ 2, 627 N.W.2d 159, 160.
658. Id.
659. Id. at 160-61.
660. Id. Linda Sollin also filed a loss of consortium claim. Id. The jury awarded nothing on
this claim. Id. 5, 627 N.W.2d at 161.
661. Id. 2,627 N.W.2d at 160-61.





667. Id. 9 5.
668. Id. 9 6.
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constitutional rights by failing to comply with "procedural mandates" and
not explaining how the percentage of fault would affect the damage award
when the jury asked the question during deliberations. 669 Sollin then
appealed.670
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Sollin had
neither requested nor objected to the omission of a jury instruction on how a
finding of comparative fault would affect a damage award. 671 Therefore,
the issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in not explaining this
affect when questioned by the jury.672 The court then looked to the current
comparative fault statute673 and its history.674 The court noted that the cur-
rent statute superseded an earlier statute,675 which allowed the judge to
instruct the jury on the effect of a comparative fault finding on a damage
award when requested. 676 Prior to the enactment of this earlier statute, it
was reversible error for either the judge or jury to comment on the ultimate
result and legal effect of a special jury instruction. 677
The court considered recent case law in other states and determined
that the "blindfold rule" had been overwhelmingly rejected.678 Citing an
Idaho case, the court noted that because a fifty-fifty comparative fault deter-
mination is appealing, it is more equitable to inform juries that such a
finding actually results in no recovery for plaintiffs rather than a fifty
percent reduction. 679 Although the court noted that it was better to inform
the jury what the ultimate result of a fifty percent comparative fault finding
would be, it stipulated that the burden was on the plaintiff's attorney to
request such an instruction.680 A court would, however, be required to give
such an instruction if it was apparent that the jury was confused about the
issue while deliberating. 681 In this case, there was no such apparent
confusion. 682  Ultimately, because Sollin had not requested the jury
instruction nor objected to its omission, there was no reversible error when
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. Id. 9,627 N.W.2d at 162.
672. Id.
673. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (1996).
674. Sollin v. Wangler, 2001 ND 96, 110, 627 N.W.2d 159, 162.
675. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (Supp. 2001) (repealed by S.L. 1987, ch. 404, § 13).
676. Sollin, 10, 627 N.W.2d at 162.
677. Id. 11. The court overruled this early line of cases. Id. 15, 627 N.W.2d at 164.
678. Id. 13, 627 N.W.2d at 163.
679. Id. 9J 13-15, 627 N.W.2d at 163-64.
680. Id. 91 16-18, 627 N.W.2d at 165.
681. Id. 9 19-21, 627 N.W.2d at 165-66.
682. Id. 91 20-21.
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the court exercised its discretion in not explaining the effects of a fifty
percent finding of comparative fault.683
TORTS - INSURANCE LAW - MOTOR VEHICLE
McPHEE V. TuFTY
In McPhee v. Tufty,684 AMCO Insurance Company appealed from an
amended judgment awarding the surviving parents of Sandra McPhee
$100,000 from the proceeds of an automobile liability policy issued by
AMCO.685 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
trial court finding that it erred in ruling the policy provided coverage under
the circumstances. 686
On November 27, 1994, Christopher Tufty was involved in an accident
with another vehicle.687 Sandra McPhee, a passenger in the vehicle driven
by Christopher, was killed in the accident.688 At the time of the accident,
Christopher Tufty was not listed as an insured driver under the AMCO
policy held by his parents because of his driving record.689 The Toyota
Corrola involved in the accident had been purchased fifteen days prior to
the accident, and no request was made to have it listed on either the AMCO
policy or another policy issued by Farm and City, which had previously
covered Christopher as an operator.690
On two separate occasions, in August and September of 1994, AMCO
requested information from the Tuftys' insurance agent regarding the status
of Christopher as a driver.691 The agent did not respond to the requests. 692
On the evening of the accident, Christopher's mother, Debra, informed the
agent of the accident.693 The agent sent a loss notice regarding the accident
to Farm and City, but not to AMCO.694 Two days after the accident, the
agent sent the previously requested driver information to AMCO, which
amended the Tuftys' policy to omit Christopher as a household member not
driving on December 1, 1994.695 In March 1995, the AMCO policy was
683. Id. 9[ 24-25, 627 N.W.2d at 166.
684. 2001 ND 51, 623 N.W.2d 390.
685. See McPhee, 1,623 N.W.2d at 392.
686. Id. 9[ 44, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
687. Id. 1 8, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
688. Id.
689. Id. 9 5, 623 N.W.2d at 392.
690. Id. 1 7, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
691. Id. 9f 6.
692. Id.
693. Id. 9 8.
694. Id.
695. Id. 9 9.
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changed to specifically exclude Christopher. 696 On November 7, 1996, the
Tuftys' agent filed an automobile loss notice regarding the accident with
AMCO.697
Sandra McPhee's parents brought a wrongful death action against
Curtis and Christopher Tufty in March 1998.698 The parties entered into a
Miller v. Shugart699 agreement in which the Tuftys confessed judgment for
$124,000.700 A stipulated judgment against Christopher was satisfied from
$24,000 in proceeds from the Farm and City policy, and the McPhees
agreed to seek the remaining $100,000 from AMCO.701 The district court
determined that Curtis Tufty was liable under the family car doctrine and
concluded that the AMCO policy provided coverage for the accident. 702
Justice Sandstrom determined that the district court did not err in find-
ing that the family car doctrine applied in this situation. 703 He looked at the
totality of the circumstances and concluded that the record supported a find-
ing that the doctrine applied.704 Curtis Tufty wrote the checks to pay for the
vehicles Christopher drove and helped him pay for other car-related expens-
es by providing access to a charge account at an auto parts store and paying
for some of the fuel for the vehicles. 705 Christopher also testified that he
would not have driven the vehicle if his father had told him not to, indicat-
ing the ability of Curtis to control the use of the vehicle. 706 Based on these
facts, Justice Sandstrom concluded that the trial court did not err in finding
that Curtis had an ownership interest in the vehicle and furnished it to
Christopher as a family vehicle.707
The other major issue was whether the AMCO policy provided
coverage in this situation.708 Whether the policy provided coverage was
dependent upon whether Curtis Tufty was "using" the vehicle at the time of
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. 91 10.
699. 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982).
700. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 10, 623 N.W.2d 390, 393. A Miller v. Shugart agree-
ment is an agreement in which the "stipulated judgment [is] not conclusive on the insurer until the
insurer [has] an opportunity to litigate the issue[] of whether it was bound by the judgment."
Miller, 316 N.W.2d at 736
701. McPhee, 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
702. Id. at 394.
703. Id. 19, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
704. Id.
705. Id. 9 18.
706. Id.
707. Id. 9 19.
708. Id. T 20.
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the accident within the meaning of the insurance policy. 709 In determining
whether Curtis was using the vehicle, Justice Sandstrom noted that "[Ilia-
bility under the family car doctrine does not ipso facto establish a 'use' of a
vehicle under the terms of an insurance policy." 710 The district court erred
in determining that Curtis Tufty used the vehicle at the time of the accident
within the meaning of the policy because he furnished the vehicle to
Christopher as a family vehicle. 711
Justice Sandstrom stated that "operating a vehicle furnished to a family
member for unrestricted use as a family automobile is insufficient, as a
matter of law, to constitute operation of the vehicle to serve a purpose of the
insured within the meaning of the insurance policy." 712 Christopher was
not on an errand for his parents at the time of the accident, nor was the
vehicle being used for any specific purpose of his parents.713 The vehicle
was being used for Christopher Tufty's own purposes and was not being
used by Curtis or Debra Tufty.714
AMCO also argued that the district court erred in finding coverage
under the "newly acquired vehicle" clause of the policy. 715 Justice Sand-
strom determined that although the vehicle was not registered, Curtis Tufty
was still the owner under the meaning of the insurance policy. 716 A newly
acquired vehicle, such as the Toyota involved in the accident, would be
automatically covered by Curtis Tufty's existing policy if notice was given
within thirty days of the acquisition of the vehicle.717 Justice Sandstrom
concluded that although the method and the timing of the notice to AMCO
of the new vehicle by Debra Tufty was adequate, the information conveyed
in the notice was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute notice of a
newly acquired vehicle under the policy. 718
Because the Tuftys were specifically aware that Christopher was not
eligible for standard coverage under the AMCO policy, they obtained a
separate high-risk policy for him.71 9 Therefore, the call to the Tuftys' agent
by Debra informing him of the accident could only have meant that she was
709. Id. 22.
710. Id. 9[ 31, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
711. Id. [ 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
712. Id. ( 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.




717. Id. 9 39, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
718. Id. T 41.
719. Id. ( 5, 623 N.W.2d at 392.
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requesting coverage under the Farm and City Policy.7 20 Accordingly, the
agent immediately sent a loss notice to Farm and City but not to AMCO.721
Neither the Tuftys nor their agent intended to add Christopher's vehicle,
and neither expected that the vehicle could even be added, to the AMCO
policy.722 Thus, Justice Sandstrom concluded that there was no compliance
with the notice requirement, and the vehicle was not covered under the
newly acquired vehicle clause of the policy.723
Justice Kapsner concurred in the result, but declined to join in its
reasoning.724 According to Justice Kapsner, the family car doctrine did not
need to be addressed, and the decision should have been based on a
determination of the contractual rights of coverage. 725  Through this
separate line of reasoning, Justice Kapsner concluded that no ambiguity,
which would permit a determination that coverage existed under the facts,
could be found.726
Justice Neumann also concurred in the result, but dissented from
paragraph thirty-two of the opinion, which held that Curtis's furnishing of
the vehicle to Christopher could not constitute a "use" under the insurance
policy. 727 Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in part and dissented in
part.728 He disagreed with the portion of the majority opinion that refused
to find Debra Tufty's report of the accident to the insurance agent could
constitute notice of the newly acquired vehicle. 729
Justice Maring concurred in part and dissented in part.730 She first
concluded that Curtis Tufty was "using" the vehicle driven by Christopher
at the time of the accident and that there was coverage under the policy re-
gardless of notice.731 Justice Maring also concluded that sufficient notice
had been given to invoke coverage under the policy.732
720. Id. ( 42, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
721. Id.
722. Id. ( 43.
723. Id. 9[ 44.
724. Id. J 47, 623 N.W.2d at 401 (Kapsner, J., concurring).
725. Id.
726. Id. T 51, 623 N.W.2d at 402.
727. Id. 9 54 (Neumann, J., concurring).
728. Id. ( 65, 623 N.W.2d at 404 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
729. Id. [ 66.
730. Id. ( 68 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
731. Id. 9 90,623 N.W.2d at 409.
732. Id.
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TORTS - LEGAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
MOEN V. THOMAS
In Moen v. Thomas,733 the defendants and the third-party plaintiffs
appealed a summary judgment dismissing their legal malpractice claim.
734
Fred Rathert, the third-party defendant, was Jay Thomas's attorney. 735 Jay
Thomas died and his will left land to his son, Jerry Thomas.736 The will
gave Jerry the option to purchase some of the estate's land, but if Jerry
chose not to purchase the parcel, he could lease it.737 Jay's wife and his
other children also received shares of the estate. 738
Jerry declined to purchase the parcel of land, but he exercised his right
to lease it.739 Rathert believed there might be possible conflicts of interest
and advised the family members to consult with their own attorneys.7 40
Later in the probate proceedings, Rathert advised the family to put the
parcel at issue into a trust.7 41 The trust indicated that Jerry had a right to
lease the parcel, and Jerry's sisters were named as co-trustees. 742 Rathert
had agreed to draft a lease between the trust and Jerry, but one of the co-
trustees sent Rathert a note stating that the sisters would draw up the
lease.743 As per these directions, Rathert did not draft the lease, and Jerry
never signed a written lease agreement with the trust.744
Jerry died and his wife Laurie remained in possession of the parcel.7 45
The co-trustees then brought a claim against Laurie to recover possession of
the land and collect damages. 746 Laurie then brought a third-party com-
plaint against Rathert for legal malpractice. 747 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Rathert because an attorney-client relation-
ship was required to bring a legal malpractice action and none existed
between Laurie and Rathert.748
733. 2001 ND 110, 628 N.W.2d 325.
734. Moen, R 1, 628 N.W.2d at 326.
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745. Id. 917.
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The issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly granted sum-
mary judgment.749 The court stated that the trial court's analysis was too
simplistic for the complex facts of the case before it.750 Whether an attor-
ney-client relationship existed is a question of fact.75' Because an attorney-
client relationship can be implied by the parties' conduct, a jury could have
drawn various inferences from the evidence presented at trial.752 Rathert's
own affidavit in support of his motion for summary judgment stated that he
provided legal advice to the family members. 753 Jerry and Laurie's notes
indicated that they believed Rathert was representing Jerry. 754 Because
there was evidence showing that Rathert suggested the trust and counseled
all family members on the use of the trust, a genuine issue of fact existed as
to whether Rathert represented Laurie and Jerry. 755 The court stated that an
attorney who advises a number of parties in such a complex situation runs
the risk of creating attorney-client relationships with all of the parties
involved, unless a disclaimer is provided. 756 Because the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice claim, the
court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 757
Justice Maring concurred in the decision, but stated that an attorney
should be liable to non-clients only in narrow circumstances where the
reason the client hired the attorney was to benefit a third party. 758 The nar-
row circumstances would generally arise in cases involving the drafting or
executing of a testamentary instrument and would not expose attorneys to
unlimited liability. 759 Justice Maring would have instructed the trial court
to determine whether Rathert owed a duty to Laurie and Jerry if the fact-
finder determined that an attorney-client relationship did not exist.
760
749. Id. 9110, 628 N.W.2d at 328.
750. Id. 91 12, 628 N.W.2d at 329.
751. Id. 9113.
752. Id. 991 13-14.
753. Id. ' 14.
754. Id. T 15, 628 N.W.2d at 330.
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Id. (1 16.
758. Id. 9[( 18-19, 628 N.W.2d at 331 (Maring, J., concurring).
759. Id. 9f 19. Justice Maring stated that in determining whether an attorney owed a duty to a
non-client, a court should balance factors such as "the extent to which the transaction was intend-
ed to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury,
and the policy of preventing future harm." Id. 91 20.
760. Id.
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TORTS - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
GREENWOOD V. PARACELSUS HEALTH CARE CORP. OF NORTH DAKOTA
Greenwood appealed the district court's decision dismissing her medi-
cal malpractice claim against Dr. Lindemoen. 761 Dr. Lindemoen had placed
a piece of gauze in Greenwood's ear to prevent blood drainage during sur-
gery.762 After surgery, Greenwood felt discomfort and fullness as though
there was water in her ear that she could not get out.763 At a follow-up visit,
Dr. Lindemoen told Greenwood that the discomfort was normal during
healing. 764
Greenwood continued to feel discomfort, and the ear developed a foul
odor.765 She later saw her regular physician and complained that her ear
felt plugged for months. 766 Upon examination, the physician found gauze
in the ear and removed it.767 Some discomfort disappeared, but she con-
tinued to experience earaches and eczema. 768 Greenwood brought medical
malpractice claims against Dr. Lindemoen and Paracelsus, the owner of the
hospital where the surgery was performed, for negligently leaving gauze in
her ear.769 After Greenwood's case presentation, the defendants moved for
judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court granted the motions,
dismissing the actions separately. 770
The trial court dismissed the action against Dr. Lindemoen because
Greenwood failed to present expert opinion testimony as required by North
Dakota Century Code section 28-01-46.771 One purpose of the statute was
761. Greenwood v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp. of N.D., 2001 ND 28, 1, 622 N.W.2d
195, 197.
762. Id. T 2.
763. Id. 9 3,622 N.W.2d at 198.
764. Id.






771. Id. 9[ 7. Section 28-01-46 of the North Dakota Century Code states:
Expert opinion required to maintain an action based upon alleged medical negligence
except in obvious cases. Any action for injury or death against a physician, nurse, or
hospital licensed by this state based upon professional negligence must be dismissed
without prejudice on motion unless the claimant has obtained an admissible expert
opinion to support the allegation of professional negligence within three months of the
commencement of the action or at such later date as set by the court for good cause
shown by the plaintiff. The expert's affidavit must identify the name and business ad-
dress of the expert, indicate the expert's field of expertise, and contain a brief sum-
mary of the basis for the expert's opinion. This section does not apply to alleged lack
of informed consent, unintentional failure to remove a foreign substance from within
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to prevent the necessity of an actual trial when a plaintiff could not
substantiate the basis for a claim.772 The court noted that section 28-01-46
was clearly intended for pre-trial use, and Dr. Lindemoen used it after the
close of the plaintiff's case. 773 Because section 28-01-46 did not apply once
the trial had begun, Greenwood's burden was to establish a prima facie case
using expert testimony where needed.774 To establish a prima facie case, "a
plaintiff must present evidence establishing the applicable standard of care,
a violation of that standard, and a causal relationship between the violation
and the harm complained of." 775 The issue on appeal was whether a jury
could have reached only one conclusion with no reasonable difference of
opinion. 77
6
North Dakota case law generally requires expert testimony to establish
the standard of care. 777 The court stated that in this case, Dr. Lindemoen
himself provided that expert testimony. 778 The court then analyzed whether
Greenwood had established that Dr. Lindemoen breached the standard of
care by leaving the gauze in her ear.779 Because Dr. Lindemoen testified
that he had placed gauze in Greenwood's ear and could not specifically
remember removing it, there was sufficient evidence to allow a jury to draw
an inference that Dr. Lindemoen had left gauze in Greenwood's ear.780
Dr. Lindemoen argued that Greenwood was required to present expert
testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care.781 The court stated
that whether Dr. Lindemoen left gauze in Greenwood's ear was an ordinary
fact question for the jury, and therefore, expert testimony was not re-
quired.782 The court stated that medical malpractice cases usually involve a
complex mix of medical, technical, and ordinary fact questions.783 While
expert testimony may be required for the medical and technical questions,
the body of a patient, or performance of a medical procedure upon the wrong patient,
organ, limb, or other part of the patient's body, or other obvious occurrence.
Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (Supp. 2001).
772. Greenwood v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp. of N.D., 2001 ND 28, 91 8, 622 N.W.2d
195, 199.
773. Id. 91J99-10.
774. Id. 91 10.
775. Id.
776. Id.
777. Id. 91 13, 622 N.W.2d at 200.
778. Id. Dr. Lindemoen "testified that the applicable standard of care would require gauze
placed in the ear during surgery to be removed, and if a physician left gauze in a patient's ear after
surgery it would fall beneath the standard of care for an oral maxillofacial surgeon." Id.
779. Id. 9[ 14.
780. Id.
781. Id. T 15.
782. Id.
783. Id. 1 16.
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the jury is to decide ordinary fact questions. 784 Because the question of
"whether Dr. Lindemoen actually left gauze in Greenwood's ear was a pure,
ordinary fact issue for the jury to decide," no expert testimony on the issue
was needed.785
Dr. Lindemoen argued that Greenwood failed to establish causation.
786
The court disagreed, stating that she had shown that she suffered harm
caused by the gauze, and a jury could find Dr. Lindemoen had negligently
placed the gauze there. 787 "Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable"
to the plaintiff, the court concluded that Greenwood had presented "a prima
facie case of medical malpractice," and therefore, the trial court erred in
granting the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
788
784. Id.
785. Id. at 200-01.
786. Id. 9117, 622 N.W.2d at 201.
787. Id. ( 9 18-19.
788. Id. ( 20.
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